We investigate whether political jurisdictions form in response to the trade-off between economies of scale and the costs of a heterogeneous population. We consider heterogeneity in income, race, ethnicity, and religion, and we test the model using American school districts, school attendance areas

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. One explanation for such behavior is that regulators take actions to maximize political support. This paper tests this jurisdictional model using Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data from 1987 to 1996. We find that facilities ’ emissions into the air and water are systematically higher in counties

Abstract Red lists serve as the most prominent tool for priority setting in applied con-servation, even though they were not originally designed for this task. Hence, threat status does not always reflect actual conservation needs and can be very different from actual conservation priorities. Therefore, red lists may at best be a suboptimal tool for setting conservation priorities in a country or region. As a response, a range of alternative or complementary tools have been developed, with approaches, methods, and parameters such as population decline, population center etc. used, differing widely among countries. One recent development is the combination of conservation status with a measure of the international importance of a population in a focal region for the global survival of a species. Here, we provide a new method that integrates the two concepts while keeping

Determination of national conservation responsibilities for species conservation in regions with multiple political jurisdictions

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This paper develops a model of the political economy of tax-setting in a multijurisdictional world, where voters ' choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously. Voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems. This forces

in different ways in different contexts and that there are varying degrees of precariousness experienced by workers. The evidence from the data also suggests that the public not-for-profit sector and unionization are critical shelters for the mostly women providers. Using a feminist political economy approach

“The torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. ” – Chief Judge Irving Kaufman, U.S. Court of Appeals “These [acts of torture] occurred on my watch. As Secretary of Defense I am accountable for them. I take full responsibility. ” – Donald Rumsfeld I.

to exclusive jurisdiction. This article draws on some key ideas of recent social theory, the sociology of the pro-fessions, and other sources to outline librarianship’s current situation.