adequately.

When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy makers preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some scholars

logging in Indonesia (Cashore and Stone 2013). However, the degree and extent of successful implementation of legality verification will depend on the decisions made by policy makers and environmental practitioners in the coming years. This paper will 1

This paper studies a penalty for lying as a means to reduce information manipulation. First, we show that the penalties for lying do not always induce an advisor to reveal truthful information. This occurs when the advisor is more biased towards the status quo than the policy maker. Second

control advocates ’ roles in regulation development

Informing climate policy given incommensurable benefits estimates by

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Adaptation benefits and costs – measurement and policy issues by

What do we know about climate policy costs and how can we learn more? by

Analysing changes in ecosystems for different levels of climate change by