Results 1 - 10 of 6,218

The Ponder Policy Specification Language

by Nicodemos Damianou , Naranker Dulay , Emil Lupu , Morris Sloman - LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE , 2001
"... The Ponder language provides a common means of specifying security policies that map onto various access control implementation mechanisms for firewalls, operating systems, databases and Java. It supports obligation policies that are event triggered conditionaction rules for policy based management ..."
Abstract - Cited by 499 (28 self) - Add to MetaCart
The Ponder language provides a common means of specifying security policies that map onto various access control implementation mechanisms for firewalls, operating systems, databases and Java. It supports obligation policies that are event triggered conditionaction rules for policy based management

A Policy Language for a Pervasive Computing Environment

by Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, Anupam Joshi - In IEEE 4th International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks , 2003
"... In this paper we describe a policy language designed for pervasive computing applications that is based on deontic concepts and grounded in a semantic language. The pervasive computing environments under consideration are those in which people and devices are mobile and use various wireless networki ..."
Abstract - Cited by 211 (19 self) - Add to MetaCart
In this paper we describe a policy language designed for pervasive computing applications that is based on deontic concepts and grounded in a semantic language. The pervasive computing environments under consideration are those in which people and devices are mobile and use various wireless

Language-Based Information-Flow Security

by Andrei Sabelfeld , Andrew C. Myers - IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS , 2003
"... Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker throug ..."
Abstract - Cited by 827 (57 self) - Add to MetaCart
Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker

MULTILISP: a language for concurrent symbolic computation

by Robert H. Halstead - ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems , 1985
"... Multilisp is a version of the Lisp dialect Scheme extended with constructs for parallel execution. Like Scheme, Multilisp is oriented toward symbolic computation. Unlike some parallel programming languages, Multilisp incorporates constructs for causing side effects and for explicitly introducing par ..."
Abstract - Cited by 529 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
Multilisp is a version of the Lisp dialect Scheme extended with constructs for parallel execution. Like Scheme, Multilisp is oriented toward symbolic computation. Unlike some parallel programming languages, Multilisp incorporates constructs for causing side effects and for explicitly introducing

Approximate Policy Iteration with a Policy Language Bias

by Alan Fern, Sungwook Yoon, Robert Givan - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research , 2003
"... We explore approximate policy iteration (API), replacing the usual costfunction learning step with a learning step in policy space. We give policy-language biases that enable solution of very large relational Markov decision processes (MDPs) that no previous technique can solve. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 140 (18 self) - Add to MetaCart
We explore approximate policy iteration (API), replacing the usual costfunction learning step with a learning step in policy space. We give policy-language biases that enable solution of very large relational Markov decision processes (MDPs) that no previous technique can solve.

Requirements for policy languages for trust negotiation

by Kent E. Seamons, Marianne Winslett, Ting Yu, Bryan Smith, Evan Child, Jared Jacobson, Hyrum Mills, Lina Yu - In 3rd International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks , 2002
"... In open systems like the Internet, traditional approaches to security based on identity do not provide a solution to the problem of establishing trust between strangers, because strangers do not share the same security domain. A new approach to establishing trust between strangers is trust negotiati ..."
Abstract - Cited by 81 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart
describe a model for trust negotiation, focusing on the central role of policies. We delineate requirements for policy languages and runtime systems for trust negotiation, and evaluate four existing policy languages for trust management with respect to those requirements. We conclude with recommendations

The click modular router

by Eddie Kohler , 2001
"... Click is a new software architecture for building flexible and configurable routers. A Click router is assembled from packet processing modules called elements. Individual elements implement simple router functions like packet classification, queueing, scheduling, and interfacing with network devic ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1167 (28 self) - Add to MetaCart
devices. A router configuration is a directed graph with elements at the vertices; packets flow along the edges of the graph. Configurations are written in a declarative language that supports user-defined abstractions. This language is both readable by humans and easily manipulated by tools. We present

Decentralized Trust Management

by Matt Blaze, Joan Feigenbaum, Jack Lacy - In Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy , 1996
"... We identify the trust management problem as a distinct and important component of security in network services. Aspects of the trust management problem include formulating security policies and security credentials, determining whether particular sets of credentials satisfy the relevant policies, an ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1025 (24 self) - Add to MetaCart
approach to trust management, based on a simple language for specifying trusted actions and trust relationships. It also describes a prototype implementation of a new trust management system, called PolicyMaker, that will facilitate the development of security features in a wide range of network services

Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?

by Robert E. Hall, Charles I. Jones , 1998
"... Output per worker varies enormously across countries. Why? On an accounting basis, our analysis shows that differences in physical capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in output per worker — we find a large amount of variation in the level of the Solow residual ..."
Abstract - Cited by 2442 (24 self) - Add to MetaCart
residual across countries. At a deeper level, we document that the differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are driven by differences in institutions and government policies, which we call social infrastructure. We treat social infrastructure as endogenous

Proof-Carrying Code

by George C. Necula , 1997
"... This paper describes proof-carrying code (PCC), a mechanism by which a host system can determine with certainty that it is safe to execute a program supplied (possibly in binary form) by an untrusted source. For this to be possible, the untrusted code producer must supply with the code a safety proo ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1240 (27 self) - Add to MetaCart
. We show in this paper how proof-carrying code might be used to develop safe assembly-language extensions of ML programs. In the context of this case study, we present and prove the adequacy of concrete representations for the safety policy, the safety proofs, and the proof validation. Finally, we
Results 1 - 10 of 6,218