The Ponder language provides a common means of specifying security policies that map onto various access control implementation mechanisms for firewalls, operating systems, databases and Java. It supports obligation policies that are event triggered conditionaction rules for policy based management

In this paper we describe a policy language designed for pervasive computing applications that is based on deontic concepts and grounded in a semantic language. The pervasive computing environments under consideration are those in which people and devices are mobile and use various wireless

Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker

Multilisp is a version of the Lisp dialect Scheme extended with constructs for parallel execution. Like Scheme, Multilisp is oriented toward symbolic computation. Unlike some parallel programming languages, Multilisp incorporates constructs for causing side effects and for explicitly introducing

We explore approximate policy iteration (API), replacing the usual costfunction learning step with a learning step in policy space. We give policy-language biases that enable solution of very large relational Markov decision processes (MDPs) that no previous technique can solve.

describe a model for trust negotiation, focusing on the central role of policies. We delineate requirements for policy languages and runtime systems for trust negotiation, and evaluate four existing policy languages for trust management with respect to those requirements. We conclude with recommendations

devices. A router configuration is a directed graph with elements at the vertices; packets flow along the edges of the graph. Configurations are written in a declarative language that supports user-defined abstractions. This language is both readable by humans and easily manipulated by tools. We present

approach to trust management, based on a simple language for specifying trusted actions and trust relationships. It also describes a prototype implementation of a new trust management system, called PolicyMaker, that will facilitate the development of security features in a wide range of network services

residual across countries. At a deeper level, we document that the differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are driven by differences in institutions and government policies, which we call social infrastructure. We treat social infrastructure as endogenous

. We show in this paper how proof-carrying code might be used to develop safe assembly-language extensions of ML programs. In the context of this case study, we present and prove the adequacy of concrete representations for the safety policy, the safety proofs, and the proof validation. Finally, we