"... In PAGE 3: ...ll outputs fj the existential quantification 9xi : fj, i.e. for a function with n inputs and m outputs, n m computations are carried out. Results are given in Table1 . In Column circuit , the name of the circuit is given.... ..."

"... In PAGE 8: ... One problem with this system is that it is based on an incomplete revelation of preferences: there is no requirement for a voter to rank the options for which he (she) did not vote. As Table2 shows, on the basis of votes cast by 60 voters, A wins by plurality, yet A would lose against B alone (25 to 35) and against C alone (23 to 37). Table 2: Plurality Voting ... In PAGE 8: ...This then points to a second defect of plurality voting which is the fact that it is subject to agenda manipulation and that the presence, or absence, of options - even if those options cannot win - can affect the outcome. The alternative is for each voter to rank the alternatives in order of preference (as in Table2 above) and then the appropriate electoral rule would aggregate these individual rankings into an overall ranking. Such a procedure is termed an apos;ordinal procedure apos;.... In PAGE 8: ...ankings into an overall ranking. Such a procedure is termed an apos;ordinal procedure apos;. One possible electoral rule, based on an ordinal procedure, is the Borda count: in the presence of N options, assign N points to the option ranked first, N-1 points to the option ranked second and finally one point to the option ranked last. A Borda count applied to the data in Table2 sees C a comfortable winner with 138 points, A coming second with 105 points and B finishing last with 91 points. The Borda count method, however, is also susceptible to false revelation of preferences: voters, irrespective of their true preferences, would be inclined to give the lowest preference vote to the candidate they thought was most threatening to their preferred candidates electoral prospects (Miller, 1987).... In PAGE 9: ... An alternative that wins over all the others is then selected the preferred option and is termed the Condorcet winner. Thus, in Table2 , the Condorcet winner C beats A, 37-23 and beats B, 41-19. However, as Table 1 showed, and as Table 4 shows, a Condorcet winner need not exist: in Table 3 demonstrates the phenomenon of apos;cyclical voting apos; - also termed the apos;paradox of voting apos; - whereby A beats B (33-27); B beats C (42-18); and C beats A (35-25).... ..."

"... In PAGE 3: ... Although, we do believe that since the Seman- tic Web standards are on verge of finalization, there will be lots of Ontology based applications over Web in near future. Table2 gives a formal treatment for some of the quantifiable features as discussed earlier. We employed the depicted formulae... ..."

"... In PAGE 3: ...i : fj, i.e. for a function with n inputs and m outputs, n a26 m computations are carried out. Results are given in Table1 . In Column circuit , the name of the circuit is given.... ..."

"... In PAGE 32: ... Switching between persons will confuse the reader. Table5 provides a list of singular and plural pronouns. Table 5.... ..."