repeated game. We show here how incomplete information about one or both players ’ options, motivation or behavior can explain the observed cooperation. Specifically, we provide a bound on the number of rounds at which Fink may be played, when one player may possibly be committed to a “Tit

social cost in making the spread of reputations optional. We prove that no equilibrium can sustain significantly more cooperation than the dues-paying equilibrium in a repeated random matching game with a large number of players in which players have finite lives and the ability to change

We analyse the entry decisions of competing firms in a two--player stochastic real option game, when rivals can exert di#erent but correlated uncertain profitabilities from operating. In the presence of entry costs, decision thresholds exhibit hysteresis, the range of which is decreasing

Abstract: We study contracts negotiated between professional baseball players and teams to investigate the use of real options in a commercial setting. Baseball contracts feature options in diverse forms, and we find that these options have significant effects on player compensation. As predicted

associated with a generous image is greater when the player holding the image is in fact generous and believes the observers to be generous as well. The model can account both for the fact that players ’ behavior sometimes depends on the opponents ’ unchosen options and for the prevalence of small symbolic

We take a coordination game and add the option to wait; each player can opt to take an action in the standard game or they can decide to wait. If one player has taken a standard option, the waiting player can adopt their best response to this action. Interpreting the payoff in the final period

We study intertemporal tradeoffs of players who fear a potential crisis in an environment with strategic complementarities. Such players may wish to delay their investment decisions in order to gather additional information. Drawing on the global game framework, we characterize the effects

abstract We derive the maximal, self-enforcing cooperation path under asymmetric information on each other's accessibility to outside options. Two players individually have private information as to whether he has an ability to pursue a stochastic outside option. The value of the outside

This paper derives the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for two-player games where each player has the option of postponing bargaining till a future period. This option endogenously determines the threat points of the initial game. The outcome is compared with the case where

used as frivolous lower-priced products. A bedside stereo system and a DVD recorder/player were chosen as frivolous higher-priced items. Eight scenarios were thus developed with order counterbalanced, varying from two products with two price levels (low vs. high) and two donation/cash discount