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124,958
Continuity of the payoff function revisited
"... The payoff function is defined on the product of the spaces of mixed strategies that are the spaces of probability measures on compact Hausdorff spaces. The continuity of the payoff function is recently proved by Glycopantis and Muir. Here we give an alternative proof that is essentially based on ex ..."
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The payoff function is defined on the product of the spaces of mixed strategies that are the spaces of probability measures on compact Hausdorff spaces. The continuity of the payoff function is recently proved by Glycopantis and Muir. Here we give an alternative proof that is essentially based
Optimal payoff functions for members of collectives
 Advances in Complex Systems
"... We consider the problem of designing (perhaps massively distributed) collectives of computational processes to maximize a provided “world ” utility function. We consider this problem when the behavior of each process in the collective can be cast as striving to maximize its own payoff utility functi ..."
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Cited by 93 (40 self)
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We consider the problem of designing (perhaps massively distributed) collectives of computational processes to maximize a provided “world ” utility function. We consider this problem when the behavior of each process in the collective can be cast as striving to maximize its own payoff utility
Learning payoff functions in infinite games
 In Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
, 2005
"... We consider a class of games with realvalued strategies and payoff information available only in the form of data from a given sample of strategy profiles. Solving such games with respect to the underlying strategy space requires generalizing from the data to a complete payofffunction representati ..."
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Cited by 14 (6 self)
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We consider a class of games with realvalued strategies and payoff information available only in the form of data from a given sample of strategy profiles. Solving such games with respect to the underlying strategy space requires generalizing from the data to a complete payofffunction
Contextual Bandits with Linear Payoff Functions
"... In this paper we study the contextual bandit problem (also known as the multiarmed bandit problem with expert advice) for linear payoff functions. For T rounds, K actions, and d(√ dimensional feature vectors, we prove an O T d ln 3) (KT ln(T)/δ) regret bound that holds with probability 1 − δ for th ..."
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Cited by 37 (4 self)
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In this paper we study the contextual bandit problem (also known as the multiarmed bandit problem with expert advice) for linear payoff functions. For T rounds, K actions, and d(√ dimensional feature vectors, we prove an O T d ln 3) (KT ln(T)/δ) regret bound that holds with probability 1 − δ
Effects of payoff functions and preference distributions in an adaptive population
, 706
"... In adaptive populations that model financial markets and distributed control, we consider how the dynamics depends on the agents ’ initial preferences of strategies as well as different payoff functions. When the diversity of the initial preferences of the strategies decreases, more agents tend to a ..."
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In adaptive populations that model financial markets and distributed control, we consider how the dynamics depends on the agents ’ initial preferences of strategies as well as different payoff functions. When the diversity of the initial preferences of the strategies decreases, more agents tend
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A CrossCountry Investigation
 Quarterly Journal of Economics
, 1997
"... This paper presents evidence that “social capital ” matters for measurable economic performance, using indicators of trust and civic norms from the World Values Surveys for a sample of 29 market economies. Memberships in formal groups—Putnam’s measure of social capital—is not associated with trust o ..."
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Cited by 1335 (8 self)
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This paper presents evidence that “social capital ” matters for measurable economic performance, using indicators of trust and civic norms from the World Values Surveys for a sample of 29 market economies. Memberships in formal groups—Putnam’s measure of social capital—is not associated with trust or with improved economic performance. We find trust and civic norms are stronger in nations with higher and more equal incomes, with institutions that restrain predatory actions of chief executives, and with bettereducated and ethnically homogeneous populations. I.
Congestion games with playerspecic payoff functions
 Games and Economic Behavior
, 1996
"... A class of noncooperative games in which the players share a common set of strategies is described. The payoff a player receives for playing a particular strategy depends only on the total number of players playing the same strategy and decreases with that number in a manner which is specic to the p ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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A class of noncooperative games in which the players share a common set of strategies is described. The payoff a player receives for playing a particular strategy depends only on the total number of players playing the same strategy and decreases with that number in a manner which is specic
Approximation Schemes For Finding The Value Functions For Differential Games With Nonterminal Payoff Functional
"... . A finite difference scheme for finding viscosity solutions of specifically stated problems for the HamiltonJacobi equations is proposed. Solutions of such problems must satisfy one of two inequalities involved into the definition of viscosity solutions in the region where they are less then a giv ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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given function. From the point of view of optimal control theory and the theory of differential games, these results can be applied to the finding the value functions of control problems and differential games with nonterminal payoff functionals of a frequently used form. Key Words. Viscosity solutions
Nondifferentiability of Payoff Functions and Nonuniqueness of Nash Equilibria
"... Abstract—Given nondegenerate intervals X i of R and an increasing ordered mapping Φ:X 1 ×···×X N → R N, games in strategic form between N players with the X i as action sets with the following three properties are studied: the set of Nash equilibria E is convex, Φ is constant on E and in each Nash ..."
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equilibrium at least one payoff function is not partially differentiable w.r.t. its own action. The results are illustrated for a special class of aggregative games that include the formal transboundary pollution games with global transboundary pollution. Keywords—Aggregative game, convex analysis, formal
Results 1  10
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124,958