T = argmax P(T|S) = argmax

We study the performance of the newly invented rateless codes (LT- and Raptor codes) on noisy channels such as the BSC and the AWGNC. We find that Raptor codes outperform LT codes, and have good performance on a wide variety of noisy channels.

Abstract not found

The title of this paper playfully contrasts two rather different approaches to language analysis. The "Noisy Channel" 's are the promoters of statistically based approaches to language learning. Many of these studies are based on the Shannons's Noisy Channel model. The "

An authentication counterpart of Wyner’s study of the wiretap channel is developed in this work. More specifically, message authentication over noisy channels is studied while impersonation and substitution attacks are investigated for both single-and multiple-message scenarios. For each scenario

We cascade an existing image coder with carefully chosen error control coding, and thus produce a progressive image compression scheme whose performance on a noisy channel is significantly better than that of previously known techniques. The main idea is to trade off the available transmission rate

Abstract. We propose a framework in which anonymity protocols are interpreted as particular kinds of channels, and the degree of anonymity provided by the protocol as the converse of the channel’s capacity. We also investigate how the adversary can test the system to try to infer the user’s

-pected distortion. This paper investigates how high the bit error rate must be for this phenomenon to occur. It also investigates the nature of optimal quantisers for extremely noisy channels, in which the error probability is almost 1/2. 1.

Communication is an important component of distributed and networked controls systems. In our companion paper we presented a framework for studying control problems with a digital noiseless communication channel connecting the sensor to the controller [TM1]. Here we generalize that framework

We consider a scenario where an attacker is able to receive a stegosignal only over a noisy channel under the very strong condition that an attacker may know even the cover message (CM). We propose to use spread-time stegosystem (STS) where the embedding of spread signals into the samples of CM