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Coalitions in nonatomic network congestion games
, 2012
"... This work shows that the formation of a finite number of coalitions in a nonatomic network congestion game benefits everyone. At the equilibrium of the composite game played by coalitions and individuals, the average cost to each coalition and the individuals ’ common cost are all lower than in the ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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This work shows that the formation of a finite number of coalitions in a nonatomic network congestion game benefits everyone. At the equilibrium of the composite game played by coalitions and individuals, the average cost to each coalition and the individuals ’ common cost are all lower than
Network Congestion GamesExample: Inefficiency of equilibria
"... Network Congestion GamesTravel time increases with congestion • Highway congestion costs were $115 billion in 2009. • Avg. commuter travels 100 minutes a day. ..."
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Network Congestion GamesTravel time increases with congestion • Highway congestion costs were $115 billion in 2009. • Avg. commuter travels 100 minutes a day.
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games
, 2008
"... We consider the problem of computing εapproximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games. The general problem is known to be PLScomplete for every ε> 0, but the reductions are based on artificial and steep delay functions with the property that already two players using the same resource ..."
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We consider the problem of computing εapproximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games. The general problem is known to be PLScomplete for every ε> 0, but the reductions are based on artificial and steep delay functions with the property that already two players using the same resource
The equilibrium existence problem in finite network congestion games
 In Proc. of the 2nd Int. Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE
, 2006
"... Abstract. An open problem is presented regarding the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE) in network congestion games with a finite number of nonidentical players, in which the strategy set of each player is the collection of all paths in a given network that link the player’s origin a ..."
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Cited by 16 (2 self)
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Abstract. An open problem is presented regarding the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE) in network congestion games with a finite number of nonidentical players, in which the strategy set of each player is the collection of all paths in a given network that link the player’s origin
1 Spectrum Sharing as Network Congestion Games
"... In this paper, we propose and analyze the properties of a new class of games the network congestion game (NCG), which is a generalization of the classical congestion game (CG). In a classical congestion game, multiple users share the same set of resources and a user’s payoff for using any resource ..."
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In this paper, we propose and analyze the properties of a new class of games the network congestion game (NCG), which is a generalization of the classical congestion game (CG). In a classical congestion game, multiple users share the same set of resources and a user’s payoff for using any resource
Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games
, 2009
"... Abstract. Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with playerspecific costs. In the first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the second, they are differently (negativ ..."
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Cited by 4 (3 self)
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Abstract. Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with playerspecific costs. In the first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the second, they are differently
The Effectiveness of Stackelberg Strategies and Tolls for Network Congestion Games
 In Proc. Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA
, 2007
"... Abstract It is well known that in a network with arbitrary(convex) latency functions that are a function of edge ..."
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Cited by 38 (1 self)
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Abstract It is well known that in a network with arbitrary(convex) latency functions that are a function of edge
Symmetry in Network Congestion Games: Pure Equilibria and Anarchy Cost
 In Proc. of the 3rd Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA ’05
, 2005
"... Abstract. We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that computes a pure Nash equilibrium with respect to traffic congestion in a network. In this algorithm each user plays o ..."
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Cited by 19 (6 self)
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Abstract. We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that computes a pure Nash equilibrium with respect to traffic congestion in a network. In this algorithm each user plays
On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users ⋆
"... Abstract. We consider network congestion games in which a finite number of noncooperative users select paths. The aim is to mitigate the inefficiency caused by the selfish users by introducing taxes on the network edges. A tax vector is strongly (weakly)optimal if all (at least one of) the equilib ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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Abstract. We consider network congestion games in which a finite number of noncooperative users select paths. The aim is to mitigate the inefficiency caused by the selfish users by introducing taxes on the network edges. A tax vector is strongly (weakly)optimal if all (at least one of
Efficient Convergence to Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Network Congestion Games
 In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Efficient and Experimental Algorithms (WEA 2005), volume 3503 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2005
"... In largescale or evolving networks, such as the Internet, there is no authority possible to enforce a centralized tra#c management. ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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In largescale or evolving networks, such as the Internet, there is no authority possible to enforce a centralized tra#c management.
Results 1  10
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