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Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
, 1991
"... According to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium in a game “involves” common knowledge of the payoff functions, of the rationality of the players, and of the strategies played. The basis for this wisdom is explored, and it turns out that considerably weaker conditions suffice. First, note that if ..."
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Cited by 236 (6 self)
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According to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium in a game “involves” common knowledge of the payoff functions, of the rationality of the players, and of the strategies played. The basis for this wisdom is explored, and it turns out that considerably weaker conditions suffice. First, note
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
, 2006
"... We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of n ..."
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Cited by 329 (23 self)
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We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability
Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality
 Review of Economic Studies
, 1999
"... prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, noncommercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtai ..."
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Cited by 231 (7 self)
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prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, noncommercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium
, 2010
"... A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of foptimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition of N ..."
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A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of foptimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition
Coalitionproof Nash Equilibrium of
, 2009
"... The purpose of this paper is to clarify the properties of a coalitionproof Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game with monotone externality and strategic substitution. In this aggregative game, every Nash equilibrium satisfies the fundamental property that no coalition can deviate from the Nash e ..."
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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the properties of a coalitionproof Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game with monotone externality and strategic substitution. In this aggregative game, every Nash equilibrium satisfies the fundamental property that no coalition can deviate from the Nash
Deterministic calibration and Nash equilibrium
 Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Conference on Learning Theory, volume 3120 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2004
"... Abstract. We provide a natural learning process in which the joint frequency of empirical play converges into the set of convex combinations of Nash equilibria. In this process, all players rationally choose their actions using a public prediction made by a deterministic, weakly calibrated algorithm ..."
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Cited by 41 (3 self)
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algorithm. Furthermore, the public predictions used in any given round of play are frequently close to some Nash equilibrium of the game. 1
Nash Equilibrium Based Fairness
, 2009
"... There are several approaches of sharing resources among users. There is a noncooperative approach wherein each user strives to maximize its own utility. The most common optimality notion is then the Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria are generally Pareto inefficient. On the other hand, we consider a ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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There are several approaches of sharing resources among users. There is a noncooperative approach wherein each user strives to maximize its own utility. The most common optimality notion is then the Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria are generally Pareto inefficient. On the other hand, we consider a
Negotiationproof Nash Equilibrium
 Internat. J. Game Theory
"... Abstract. This paper defines “negotiationproof Nash equilibrium”, a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. It recognizes the possibility that a group of selfinterested players may choose to coordinate, nonbind ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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Abstract. This paper defines “negotiationproof Nash equilibrium”, a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. It recognizes the possibility that a group of selfinterested players may choose to coordinate
Communication leading to Nash equilibrium
"... To Shoji Koizumi on the occasion of his 77th birthday ABSTRACT. A preplay communicationprocess is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game. In the communication process each player predicts the other players ’ actions, and $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mat ..."
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To Shoji Koizumi on the occasion of his 77th birthday ABSTRACT. A preplay communicationprocess is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game. In the communication process each player predicts the other players ’ actions, and $\mathrm
Results 1  10
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4,816