Results 1  10
of
342,264
On Characterization of Nash Equilibrium Strategy of Bimatrix Games with Fuzzy Payoffs
, 2006
"... In this paper, we consider fuzzy $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}$matrix games, namely, twoperson games with fuzzy payoff. Based on fuzzy $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}s_{\llcorner}’ $ order, for such games: we define three kinds of concepts of Nash equilibrium $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}r$ategies and investigate their pro ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
In this paper, we consider fuzzy $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}$matrix games, namely, twoperson games with fuzzy payoff. Based on fuzzy $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}s_{\llcorner}’ $ order, for such games: we define three kinds of concepts of Nash equilibrium $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}r$ategies and investigate
A Statistical Exploitation Module for Texas Hold’em And It’s Benefits When Used With an Approximate Nash Equilibrium Strategy
"... Abstract — An approximate Nash equilibrium strategy is difficult for opponents of all skill levels to exploit, but it is not able to exploit opponents. Opponent modeling strategies on the other hand provide the ability to exploit weak players, but have the disadvantage of being exploitable to strong ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract — An approximate Nash equilibrium strategy is difficult for opponents of all skill levels to exploit, but it is not able to exploit opponents. Opponent modeling strategies on the other hand provide the ability to exploit weak players, but have the disadvantage of being exploitable
Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Directional Models of TwoCandidate Spatial Competition.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society
, 1996
"... Abstract. The standard approach to twoparty political competition in a multidimensional issue space models voters as voting for the alternative that is located closest to their own most preferred location. Another approach to understanding voter choice is based on preferred direction of change wit ..."
Abstract

Cited by 4 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. The standard approach to twoparty political competition in a multidimensional issue space models voters as voting for the alternative that is located closest to their own most preferred location. Another approach to understanding voter choice is based on preferred direction of change with respect to some specified neutral point (e.g., an origin or status quo point). For the twodimensional Matthews directional model (Matthews, 1979), we provide geometric conditions in terms of the number of medians through the neutral point for there to be a Condorcet (undominated) direction. In this twodimensional setting, the set of residual locations for which no Condorcet directions exist is identical to the null dual set (Schofield, 1978) and to the heart (Schofield, 1993). In two dimensions, for most locations of the origin/status quo point, a Condorcet direction exists and points toward the yolk, a geometric construct first identified by McKelvey (1986). We also provide some simulation results on the size of the null dual set in two dimensions when the underlying distribution of points is nonsymmetric. 1.
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
Abstract

Cited by 556 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
Automobile prices in market equilibrium
 Econometrica
, 1995
"... Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at ..."
Abstract

Cited by 510 (18 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
, 2006
"... We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of n ..."
Abstract

Cited by 324 (23 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies
 American Economic Review
, 2005
"... This paper argues that a broad class of search models cannot generate the observed businesscyclefrequency fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in response to shocks of a plausible magnitude. In the U.S., the vacancyunemployment ratio is 20 times as volatile as average labor productivity ..."
Abstract

Cited by 839 (20 self)
 Add to MetaCart
that wages are determined by Nash bargaining. ∗ This is a major revision of ‘Equilibrium Unemployment Fluctuations’. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Olivier
Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
, 1991
"... According to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium in a game “involves” common knowledge of the payoff functions, of the rationality of the players, and of the strategies played. The basis for this wisdom is explored, and it turns out that considerably weaker conditions suffice. First, note that if ..."
Abstract

Cited by 226 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
According to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium in a game “involves” common knowledge of the payoff functions, of the rationality of the players, and of the strategies played. The basis for this wisdom is explored, and it turns out that considerably weaker conditions suffice. First, note
Results 1  10
of
342,264