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The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 563 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution
, 2004
"... I prove that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy ‘Disagreement Point Convexity ’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’. I explain how this improves previous results obtained by Chun (1990) and by Dagan et al. (2002). 1 ..."
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I prove that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy ‘Disagreement Point Convexity ’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’. I explain how this improves previous results obtained by Chun (1990) and by Dagan et al. (2002). 1
Nash Bargaining without Convexity
, 2005
"... In this note I study Nash bargaining when the utility possibility set of the bargaining problem is nonconvex. A simple variation of Nashs symmetry axiom is all that is necessary to establish a set valued version of Nashs solution in nonconvex settings. I would like to thank Kaushik Basu for useful ..."
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In this note I study Nash bargaining when the utility possibility set of the bargaining problem is nonconvex. A simple variation of Nashs symmetry axiom is all that is necessary to establish a set valued version of Nashs solution in nonconvex settings. I would like to thank Kaushik Basu
On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise
, 2002
"... Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size. Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus as in the Nash demand game with noise or remain silent and wait until the surplus was publicly observed. Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy Nash d ..."
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Cited by 5 (3 self)
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demand game results in two strict equilibria, in each of which one player takes almost the whole surplus, provided uncertainty is small. If commitments concern only who makes the first offer, the more balanced Nash bargaining solution is approximately restored. In all cases commitment occurs
Nash Bargaining with the Option to Wait*
, 1996
"... This paper derives the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for twoplayer games where each player has the option of postponing bargaining till a future period. This option endogenously determines the threat points of the initial game. The outcome is compared with the case where there is no such opt ..."
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This paper derives the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for twoplayer games where each player has the option of postponing bargaining till a future period. This option endogenously determines the threat points of the initial game. The outcome is compared with the case where
Mediation and the Nash Bargaining Solution
, 2000
"... 1 I Thank Ariel Rubinstein for pointing me toward this problem and an anonymous referee for pointing out some ambiguities in an earlier version. Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University is gratefully acknowledged. This paper analyzes a model of bargaining in w ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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in which two parties use a mediator who sequentially makes random proposals until agreement by both parties is reached. I show that as the cost of delay shrinks to zero, the subgame perfect payoff converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with weights determined by the relative discount rates
On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution
, 1999
"... The present paper provides three different supporting results for the Nash bargaining solution of nperson bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a noncooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash so ..."
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The present paper provides three different supporting results for the Nash bargaining solution of nperson bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a noncooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash
Nash bargaining with downward rigid wages
, 1997
"... We study the effect of downward wage rigidity in a dynamic model when wages are negotiated according to Nash bargaining. Downward rigidity causes a decrease in the worker’s expected utility. For the firms the effect is ambiguous. ..."
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We study the effect of downward wage rigidity in a dynamic model when wages are negotiated according to Nash bargaining. Downward rigidity causes a decrease in the worker’s expected utility. For the firms the effect is ambiguous.
Nash Bargaining in Ordinal Environments
, 2004
"... We analyze the implications of Nash’s (1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom needs to be strenghtened to take into account all orderpreserving transformations of the agents ’ utilities. This axiom, called ordinal invariance, is a very demanding one. For ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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We analyze the implications of Nash’s (1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom needs to be strenghtened to take into account all orderpreserving transformations of the agents ’ utilities. This axiom, called ordinal invariance, is a very demanding one
andtheNashBargainingProblem
"... ＴｈｅＮａｓｈｂａｒｇａｉｎｉｎｇｐｒｏｂｌｅｍｉｓｃｏｎｓｉｄｅｒｅｄａｓａｇａｍｅｐｌａｙｅｄ ｂｙｔｗｏｅｘｐｅｃｔedutilitymaximizerswithpriorprobabilitydistri‐ butionsovertheopponent,sstrategyset・Ａｎａｔｕｒａｌｒｅｑｕｉｒｅｍｅｎｔ ｏｆｍｕｔｕａｌｃｏｎSistencyandinterchangeabilityoｆｐａｉｒｓｏｆｐｒｉｏｒｓｉｓ ｓｈｏｗｎｔｏｂｅｎｅｃｅｓsａｒｙａｎｄｓｕＨｉｃｉｅｎｔｔｏｓｉｎｇｌｅｏｕｔｔｈｅｏｎｌｙｄｉｓ‐ tributionthatgeneratesth ..."
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ＴｈｅＮａｓｈｂａｒｇａｉｎｉｎｇｐｒｏｂｌｅｍｉｓｃｏｎｓｉｄｅｒｅｄａｓａｇａｍｅｐｌａｙｅｄ ｂｙｔｗｏｅｘｐｅｃｔedutilitymaximizerswithpriorprobabilitydistri‐ butionsovertheopponent,sstrategyset・Ａｎａｔｕｒａｌｒｅｑｕｉｒｅｍｅｎｔ ｏｆｍｕｔｕａｌｃｏｎSistencyandinterchangeabilityoｆｐａｉｒｓｏｆｐｒｉｏｒｓｉｓ ｓｈｏｗｎｔｏｂｅｎｅｃｅｓsａｒｙａｎｄｓｕＨｉｃｉｅｎｔｔｏｓｉｎｇｌｅｏｕｔｔｈｅｏｎｌｙｄｉｓ‐ tributionthatgeneratestheequivalenceoftheexpectedutility maxiｍｉｚａｔｉｏｎａｎｄｔｈｅＮａｓｈｐｒｏｄｕｃｔｍａｘｉｍization．
Results 1  10
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