We propose an algorithm called query by committee, in which a committee of students is trained on the same data set. The next query is chosen according to the principle of maximal disagreement. The algorithm is studied for two toy models: the high-low game and perceptron learning of another

the incentive to settle and with the proper disagreement jfoint chosen. The results provide a guide for the application of the Nash bar-gaining solution in economic modelling. 1.

The problem of combining preferences arises in several applications, such as combining the results of different search engines. This work describes an efficient algorithm for combining multiple preferences. We first give a formal framework for the problem. We then describe and analyze a new boosting algorithm for combining preferences called RankBoost. We also describe an efficient implementation of the algorithm for certain natural cases. We discuss two experiments we carried out to assess the performance of RankBoost. In the first experiment, we used the algorithm to combine different WWW search strategies, each of which is a query expansion for a given domain. For this task, we compare the performance of RankBoost to the individual search strategies. The second experiment is a collaborative-filtering task for making movie recommendations. Here, we present results comparing RankBoost to nearest-neighbor and regression algorithms.

Conditional random fields for sequence labeling offer advantages over both generative models like HMMs and classifiers applied at each sequence position. Among sequence labeling tasks in language processing, shallow parsing has received much attention, with the development of standard evaluation datasets and extensive comparison among methods. We show here how to train a conditional random field to achieve performance as good as any reported base noun-phrase chunking method on the CoNLL task, and better than any reported single model. Improved training methods based on modern optimization algorithms were critical in achieving these results. We present extensive comparisons between models and training methods that confirm and strengthen previous results on shallow parsing and training methods for maximum-entropy models.

This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive inefficient because the incentives may crowd out voluntary co-operation. It strongly limits the effects of competition in markets with incomplete contracts and gives rise to noncompetitive wage differences. Finally, reciprocity it is also a strong force contributing to the existence of incomplete contracts.

We review the literature on semi-supervised learning, which is an area in machine learning and more generally, artificial intelligence. There has been a whole spectrum of interesting ideas on how to learn from both labeled and unlabeled data, i.e. semi-supervised learning. This document is a chapter excerpt from the author’s doctoral thesis (Zhu, 2005). However the author plans to update the online version frequently to incorporate the latest development in the field. Please obtain the latest version at http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~jerryzhu/pub/ssl_survey.pdf

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Many AI researchers are today striving to build agent teams for complex, dynamic multi-agent domains, with intended applications in arenas such as education, training, entertainment, information integration, and collective robotics. Unfortunately, uncertainties in these complex, dynamic domains obstruct coherent teamwork. In particular, team members often encounter differing, incomplete, and possibly inconsistent views of their environment. Furthermore, team members can unexpectedly fail in fulfilling responsibilities or discover unexpected opportunities. Highly flexible coordination and communication is key in addressing such uncertainties. Simply tting individual agents with precomputed coordination plans will not do, for their in flexibility can cause severe failures in teamwork, and their domain-specificity hinders reusability. Our central hypothesis is that the key to such flexibility and reusability isproviding agents with general models of teamwork. Agents exploit such models to autonomously reason about coordination and communication, providing requisite flexibility. Furthermore, the models enable reuse across domains, both saving implementation effort and enforcing consistency. This article presents one general, implemented model of teamwork, called STEAM. The basic building block of teamwork in STEAM is joint intentions (Cohen & Levesque, 1991b); teamwork in STEAM is based on agents' building up a (partial) hierarchy of joint intentions (this hierarchy is seen to parallel Grosz & Kraus's partial Shared-Plans, 1996). Furthermore, in STEAM, team members monitor the team's and individual members' performance, reorganizing the team as necessary. Finally, decision-theoretic communication selectivity in STEAM ensures reduction in communication overheads of teamwork, with appropriate sensitivity to the environmental conditions. This article describes STEAM's application in three different complex domains, and presents detailed empirical results.

In this article, we attempt to distinguish between the properties of moderator and mediator variables at a number of levels. First, we seek to make theorists and researchers aware of the importance of not using the terms moderator and mediator interchangeably by carefully elaborating, both conceptually and strategically, the many ways in which moderators and mediators differ. We then go beyond this largely pedagogical function and delineate the conceptual and strategic implications of making use of such distinctions with regard to a wide range of phenomena, including control and stress, attitudes, and personality traits. We also provide a specific compendium of analytic procedures appropriate for making the most effective use of the moderator and mediator distinction, both separately and in terms of a broader causal system that includes both moderators and mediators. The purpose of this analysis is to distinguish between the properties of moderator and mediator variables in such a way as to clarify the different ways in which conceptual variables may account for differences in peoples ' behavior. Specifically, we differentiate between two often-confused functions of third variables: (a) the moderator function of third variables, which

In a 1935 paper, and in his book Theory of Probability, Jeffreys developed a methodology for quantifying the evidence in favor of a scientific theory. The centerpiece was a number, now called the Bayes factor, which is the posterior odds of the null hypothesis when the prior probability on the null is one-half. Although there has been much discussion of Bayesian hypothesis testing in the context of criticism of P -values, less attention has been given to the Bayes factor as a practical tool of applied statistics. In this paper we review and discuss the uses of Bayes factors in the context of five scientific applications in genetics, sports, ecology, sociology and psychology.