programs that drive a virtual reality or virtual environment interface? Based on experience with the Virginia Tech CAVE augmented by a literature search, we propose three key requirements for successful CAVEbased simulations: (1) Portability among CAVE-specific input/output devices, (2) effective

nodes. DSNs may be deployed in hostile areas where communication is monitored and nodes are subject to capture and surreptitious use by an adversary. Hence DSNs require cryptographic protection of communications, sensorcapture detection, key revocation and sensor disabling. In this paper, we present a

) to establish pairwise keys, tolerance of node captures, and low communication overhead. Finally, this paper presents a technique to reduce the computation at sensors required by these schemes.

Many emerging applications (e.g., teleconference, real-time information services, pay per view, distributed interactive simulation, and collaborative work) are based upon a group communications model, i.e., they require packet delivery from one or more authorized senders to a very large number

Key establishment in sensor networks is a challenging problem because asymmetric key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource constrained sensor nodes, and also because the nodes could be physically compromised by an adversary. We present three new mechanisms for key establishment using

the requirements for Internet host software. This RFC covers the communications protocol layers: link layer, IP layer, and transport layer; its companion RFC-1123 covers the application and support protocols.

Abstract-A new signature scheme is proposed, together with an imple-mentation of the Diffie-Hellman key distribution scheme that achieves a public key cryptosystem. The security of both systems relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields. I.

this paper, we provide a framework in which to study the security of key pre-distribution schemes, propose a new key pre-distribution scheme which substantially improves the resilience of the network compared to previous schemes, and give an in-depth analysis of our scheme in terms of network

In this paper we analyse the well known Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using FDR, a refinement checker for CSP. We use FDR to discover an attack upon the protocol, which allows an intruder to impersonate another agent. We adapt the protocol, and then use FDR to show that the new protocol

methodology for systematic advance. To this end, we identify key requirements, develop a small device that is representative of the class, design a tiny event-driven operating system, and show that it provides support for efficient modularity and concurrency-intensive operation. Our operating system fits