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Strength of evidence, judged probability, and choice under uncertainty

by Craig R. Fox - Cognitive Psychology , 1999
"... This paper traces, within subjects, the relationship between assessed strength of evidence, judgments of probability, and decisions under uncertainty. The investigation relies on the theoretical framework provided by support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997), a ..."
Abstract - Cited by 18 (6 self) - Add to MetaCart
nonextensional model of judgment under uncertainty. Fans of professional basketball (N � 50) judged the probability that each of eight teams, four divisions, and two conferences would win the National Basketball Association championship. Additionally, participants rated the relative strength of each team, judged

A randomized protocol for signing contracts

by Michael Ben-Or, Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, Ronald L. Rivest , 1990
"... Two parties, A and B, want to sign a contract C over a communication network. To do so, they must “simultaneously” exchange their commitments to C. Since simultaneous exchange is usually impossible in practice, protocols are needed to approximate simultaneity by exchanging partial commitments in pie ..."
Abstract - Cited by 599 (11 self) - Add to MetaCart
in piece by piece manner. During such a protocol, one party or another may have a slight advantage; a “fair” protocol keeps this advantage within acceptable limits. We present a new protocol that is fair in the sense that, at any stage in its execution, the conditional probability that one party cannot

The Strategy Behind Belief Revision: A Matter of Judging Probability or the Use of Mental Models?

by Ann G. Wolf, Markus Knauff
"... Research in the field of human reasoning has shown repeatedly that people find it reasonably easy to detect inconsistencies. The question that still remains is how people revise their beliefs to undo these inconsistencies. We report two experiments in which subjects had to make belief revision choic ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
choices on modus ponens (MP) and modus tollens (MT) sets of problems that contained conditionals with different levels of probability. After the final statement of each set, which was stated to be true, they had to decide which of the first two statements they believed more. The results showed

Scene perception: detecting and judging objects undergoing relational violations

by Irving Biederman, Robert J. Mezzanotte, Jan, C. Rabinowitz , 1982
"... Five classes of relations between an object and its setting can characterize the organization of objects into real-world scenes. The relations are (1) Interposition (objects interrupt their background), (2) Support (objects tend to rest on surfaces), (3) Probability (objects tend to be found in some ..."
Abstract - Cited by 222 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
Five classes of relations between an object and its setting can characterize the organization of objects into real-world scenes. The relations are (1) Interposition (objects interrupt their background), (2) Support (objects tend to rest on surfaces), (3) Probability (objects tend to be found

The enhancement e¤ect in probability judgment

by Derek J. Koehler, Lyle A. Brenner, Amos Tversky - Journal of Behavioral Decision Making , 1997
"... Research has shown that the judged probability of an event depends on the specificity with which the focal and alternative hypotheses are described. In particular, unpacking the components of the focal hypothesis generally increases the judged probability of the focal hypothesis, while unpacking the ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
Research has shown that the judged probability of an event depends on the specificity with which the focal and alternative hypotheses are described. In particular, unpacking the components of the focal hypothesis generally increases the judged probability of the focal hypothesis, while unpacking

Judging the probability of representative and unrepresentative unpackings

by Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Steven A. Sloman, Edward J. Wisniewski - In Johanna D. Moore (Ed.), Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 376–380). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum , 2001
"... The hypothesis that category descriptions are interpreted narrowly, in terms of representative instances, is examined by comparing probability judgments for packed descriptions of events to judgments for coextensional unpacked descriptions. The representativeness of the unpacked instance was varied ..."
Abstract - Cited by 3 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
The hypothesis that category descriptions are interpreted narrowly, in terms of representative instances, is examined by comparing probability judgments for packed descriptions of events to judgments for coextensional unpacked descriptions. The representativeness of the unpacked instance was varied

Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability

by Jochen Braun, Christof Koch, Joel L. Davis, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman
"... is provided in screen-viewable form for personal use only by members ..."
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is provided in screen-viewable form for personal use only by members

The effects of averaging subjective probability estimates between and within judges

by Dan Ariely, Wing Tung Au, Randall H. Bender, David V. Budescu, Christiane B. Dietz, Hongbin Gu, Thomas S. Wallsten, Gal Zauberman - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied , 2000
"... The average probability estimate of J> 1 judges is generally better than its components. Two studies test 3 predictions regarding averaging that follow from theorems based on a cognitive model of the judges and idealizations of the judgment situation. Prediction 1 is that the average of condition ..."
Abstract - Cited by 32 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
The average probability estimate of J> 1 judges is generally better than its components. Two studies test 3 predictions regarding averaging that follow from theorems based on a cognitive model of the judges and idealizations of the judgment situation. Prediction 1 is that the average

Choice Strategies in Multiple-Cue Probability Learning

by Chris M. White, Derek J. Koehler
"... Choice strategies for selecting among outcomes in multiple-cue probability learning were investigated using a simulated medical diagnosis task. Expected choice probabilities (the proportion of times each outcome was selected given each cue pattern) under alternative choice strategies were constructe ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
constructed from corresponding observed judged probabilities (of each outcome given each cue pattern) and compared with observed choice probabilities. Most of the participants were inferred to have responded by using a deterministic strategy, in which the outcome with the higher judged probability

Temporal distance moderates description dependence of subjective probability

by Baler Bilgin , Lyle Brenner - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 2008
"... Abstract Probability judgment is description-dependent; different descriptions of the same event can elicit different judged probabilities. We propose that the temporal proximity of an event moderates the degree of description dependence in probability judgment. According to construal level theory, ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract Probability judgment is description-dependent; different descriptions of the same event can elicit different judged probabilities. We propose that the temporal proximity of an event moderates the degree of description dependence in probability judgment. According to construal level theory
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