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Are investors reluctant to realize their losses

by Terrance Odean - Journal of Finance , 1998
"... I test the disposition effect, the tendency of investors to hold losing investments too long and sell winning investments too soon, by analyzing trading records for 10,000 accounts at a large discount brokerage house. These investors demonstrate a strong preference for realizing winners rather than ..."
Abstract - Cited by 657 (14 self) - Add to MetaCart
I test the disposition effect, the tendency of investors to hold losing investments too long and sell winning investments too soon, by analyzing trading records for 10,000 accounts at a large discount brokerage house. These investors demonstrate a strong preference for realizing winners rather than

Trading is hazardous to your wealth: The common stock investment performance of individual investors

by Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean - JOURNAL OF FINANCE , 2000
"... Individual investors who hold common stocks directly pay a tremendous performance penalty for active trading. Of 66,465 households with accounts at a large discount broker during 1991 to 1996, those that trade most earn an annual return of 11.4 percent, while the market returns 17.9 percent. The ave ..."
Abstract - Cited by 494 (27 self) - Add to MetaCart
. The average household earns an annual return of 16.4 percent, tilts its common stock investment toward high-beta, small, value stocks, and turns over 75 percent of its portfolio annually. Overconfidence can explain high trading levels and the resulting poor performance of individual investors. Our central

Investor psychology and security market under- and overreactions

by Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer - Journal of Finance , 1998
"... We propose a theory of securities market under- and overreactions based on two well-known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors ’ confidence as a function of their investment ..."
Abstract - Cited by 698 (43 self) - Add to MetaCart
We propose a theory of securities market under- and overreactions based on two well-known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors ’ confidence as a function of their investment

Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have

by Stewart C. Myers, Nicholas S. Majluf , 1984
"... This paper considers a firm that must issue common stock to raise cash to undertake a valuable investment opportunity. Management is assumed to know more about the firm’s value than potential investors. Investors interpret the firm’s actions rationally. An. equilibrium mode1 of the issue-invest deci ..."
Abstract - Cited by 2602 (7 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper considers a firm that must issue common stock to raise cash to undertake a valuable investment opportunity. Management is assumed to know more about the firm’s value than potential investors. Investors interpret the firm’s actions rationally. An. equilibrium mode1 of the issue-invest

Investing for the long run when returns are predictable

by Nicholas Barberis - Journal of Finance , 2000
"... We examine how the evidence of predictability in asset returns affects optimal portfolio choice for investors with long horizons. Particular attention is paid to estimation risk, or uncertainty about the true values of model parameters. We find that even after incorporating parameter uncertainty, th ..."
Abstract - Cited by 444 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
of Samuelson ~1969! and Merton ~1969!. They show that if asset returns are i.i.d., an investor with power utility who rebalances his portfolio optimally should choose the same asset allocation, regardless of investment horizon. In light of the growing body of evidence that returns are predictable, the investor

Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector

by Bengt Holmstrom, Jean Tirole - Quarterly Journal of Economics , 1997
"... We study an incentive model of ®nancial intermediation in which ®rms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across ®rms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show that al ..."
Abstract - Cited by 547 (7 self) - Add to MetaCart
We study an incentive model of ®nancial intermediation in which ®rms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across ®rms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show

Costly search and mutual fund flows

by Erik R. Sirri, Peter Tufano - Journal of Finance , 1998
"... This paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds. Consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information, but do so asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period. Search costs seem to be an importa ..."
Abstract - Cited by 523 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds. Consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information, but do so asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period. Search costs seem

Investment Banking, Reputation and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings

by Randolph P. Beatty, Jay R. Ritter - Journal of Financial Economics , 1986
"... This paper develops and tests two propositions. We demonstrate that there is a monotone relation between the (expected) underpricing of an initial public offering and the uncertainty of investors regarding its value. We also argue that the resulting underpricing equilibrium is enforced by investment ..."
Abstract - Cited by 351 (14 self) - Add to MetaCart
by investment bankers, who have reputation capital at stake. An investment banker who ‘cheats ’ on this underpricing equilibrium will lose either potential investors (if it doesn’t underprice enough) or issuers (if it underprices too much), and thus forfeit the value of its reputation capital. Empirical

The Investment behavior and performance of various investor

by ( M Grinblatt , ; 43}67 Barberis - HAC standard errors & covariance (Prewhitening with lags = 1, Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 4.0000) Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. , 2000
"... Abstract Using data from Finland, this study analyzes the extent to which past returns determine the propensity to buy and sell. It also analyzes whether these di!erences in past-return-based behavior and di!erences in investor sophistication drive the performance of various investor types. We &quo ..."
Abstract - Cited by 249 (15 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract Using data from Finland, this study analyzes the extent to which past returns determine the propensity to buy and sell. It also analyzes whether these di!erences in past-return-based behavior and di!erences in investor sophistication drive the performance of various investor types. We

The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment

by David S. Scharfstein, Jeremy C. Stein, Preston Mcafee, Vik N, Julio Rotemberg, René Stulz, Dimitri Vayanos - Journal of Finance , 1999
"... We develop a two-tiered agency model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent-seeking, division mangers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the ..."
Abstract - Cited by 331 (12 self) - Add to MetaCart
the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra com- pensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of "socialism" in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker
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