: Reasoning about knowledge seems to play a fundamental role in distributed systems. Indeed, such reasoning is a central part of the informal intuitive arguments used in the design of distributed protocols. Communication in a distributed system can be viewed as the act of transforming the system

argument to f can change its output. The new analysis shows that for several particular applications substantially less noise is needed than was previously understood to be the case. The first step is a very clean characterization of privacy in terms of indistinguishability of transcripts. Additionally, we

present our case first by using intuitively plausible arguments and then by showing actual results on a face database. Our overall conclusion is that when the training dataset is small, PCA can outperform LDA, and also that PCA is less sensitive to different training datasets. Keywords: face recognition

used. We conclude in Section V. 2 I. Theoretical Determinants of Credit Spread Changes So-called structural models of default provide an intuitive framework for identifying the determinants of credit spread changes. 4 These models build on the original insights of Black and Scholes (1973), who

The standard assumption in the literature is that Kripke’s argument against the identity theory presupposes that an identity statement can be true a posteriori only if at least one of the concepts flanking the identity sign refers contingently (Chalmers [1996]; Garcia-Carpintero and Macia [2006

is supported by intuitive arguments and simulation results in many relevant scenarios.

variables, proper linear models outperform clinical intuition. Improper linear models are those in which the weights of the predictor variables are obtained by some nonoptimal method; for example, they may be obtained on the basis of intuition, derived from simulating a clinical judge's predictions

An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have in

statement. We shall observe that the most common argumentations come out from the effort to adjust the proof of the first statement to the second one. Analysing these argumentations, it will emerge that for the students the (false) equivalence between a statement and its inverse is intuitive and the (true

. This property is conceived of as a semantic modal property that distinguishes proper names from descriptions. It is argued that there is a semantic modal asym-metry between expressions of these types. In this talk I shall challenge this assumption. By examining the intuitive Kripkean argument or test employed I