Abstract Two kinds of contemporary developments in cryp-communications over an insecure channel order to use cryptogtography are examined. Widening applications of teleprocess-raphy to insure privacy, however, it currently necessary for the ing have given rise to a need for new types

of interest. The approach applies equally well to both single channel and two color microarray experiments. Consistent, closed form estimators are derived for the hyperparameters in the model. The estimators proposed have robust behavior even for small numbers of arrays and allow for incomplete data arising

PXY Z , can also receive all messages exchanged by the two parties over a public channel. The goal of a protocol is that the enemy obtains at most a negligible amount of information about S. Upper bounds on H(S) as a function of PXY Z are presented. Lower bounds on the rate H(S)=N (as N !1

and authenticated information over an insecure network. These protocols are secure against active attacks, and have the property that the password is protected against off-line "dictionary" attacks. There are a number of other useful applications as well, including secure public telephones.

Abstract- This paper provides a general treatment of pri-vacy amplification by public discussion, a concept introduced by Bennett, Brassard, and Robert for a special scenario. Privacy amplification is a process that allows two parties to distill a secret key from a common random variable about

We propose a way to establish peer-to-peer authenticated communications over an insecure channel by using an extra channel which can authenticate very short strings, e.g. 15 bits. We call this SAS-based authentication as for authentication based on Short Authenticated Strings. The extra channel

public-key-based key exchange protocol, as well as inexpensive hash-based alternatives. In our approach, devices exchange a limited amount of public information over a privileged side channel, which will then allow them to complete an authenticated key exchange protocol over the wireless link. Our

Cryptographic computations are often carried out on insecure devices for which the threat of key exposure represents a serious and realistic concern. In an e#ort to mitigate the damage caused by exposure of secret data (e.g., keys) stored on such devices, the paradigm of forward security

According to traditional conceptions of cryptographic security, it is necessary to transmit a key, by secret means, before encrypted messages can be sent securely. This paper shows that it is possible to select a key over open communications channels in such a fashion that communications security

Tor is the second generation Onion Router, supporting the anonymous transport of TCP streams over the Internet. Its low latency makes it very suitable for common tasks, such as web browsing, but insecure against trafficanalysis attacks by a global passive adversary. We present new traffic