Unsupervised learning of feature hierarchies is often a good strategy to ini-tialize deep architectures for supervised learning. Most existing deep learning methods build these feature hierarchies layer by layer in a greedy fashion using either auto-encoders or restricted Boltzmann machines. Both

with the Contractive and Sparse Auto-Encoders. 1

auto-encoders on a range of datasets. This penalty term corresponds to the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix of the encoder activations with respect to the input. We show that this penalty term results in a localized space contraction which in turn yields robust fea-tures on the activation layer

Contract manufacturers sell capacity under different terms to different buyers. In a common practice, the supplier offers a market standard price and lead-time combination for products listed in its catalog. At the same time, it strikes contracts with some high-volume customers who require

be signed by the participants to take effect. Each contract expresses its accounting policy using a limited language, with high expressiveness but predictable execution times. This is evaluated within a novel resource economy, in which physical resources, trust and money are treated homogeneously. A second-order

and covariance functions are the local ex-pected value and local covariance under that target density. Then we show that an auto-encoder with a contractive penalty captures estimators of these local moments in its reconstruction function and its Jacobian. A contribution of this work is thus a novel alternative

This paper analyzes a contract between farmers and the processor, Danisco Foods. Production of peas for consumption requires a highly accurate coordination, which is obtained through centralized decision-making. The contract is based on a tournament system providing risk sharing between the farmers

Firing-cost-free temporary contracts were introduced in Europe during the 1980s in order to ght unemployment in a context of high firing costs that were politically hard to decrease. Since then, they have become a prevalent labor market institution in many countries. Yet evidence indicates

Abstract: Construction contract auctions are characterised by (1) a heavy emphasis on the lowest bid as that is which usually determines the winner of the auction, (2) anticipated high outliers due to the presence of uncompetitive bids, (3) very small samples, and (4) uncertainty of the appropriate

Abstract: We consider three broad types of employment contract vis, self-employment, PRP, and fixed wage employment. We focus on the implied degree of income risk associated with each type of employment contract, arguing that such risk falls as we move from self-employment at one extreme to fixed