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education? Many campuses around the country are asking this question. To provide a focus for their work, we offer seven principles based on research on good teaching and learning in colleges and universities. Good practice in undergraduate education: 1. Encourages contacts between students and faculty. 2

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-period alternating offer, and dictator games; games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the gift exchange game; and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand and Cournot markets, and the guessing game.

We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good

. This paper and the others in this symposium explore the economics of such systems. Market competition between systems, as opposed to market competition between individual products, highlights at least three important issues: expectations, coordination, and compatibility. A recent wave of research has focused

We present a novel statistical and variational approach to image segmentation based on a new algorithm named region competition. This algorithm is derived by minimizing a generalized Bayes/MDL criterion using the variational principle. The algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a local minimum

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats.

. The decoding of both codes can be tackled with a practical sum-product algorithm. We prove that these codes are "very good," in that sequences of codes exist which, when optimally decoded, achieve information rates up to the Shannon limit. This result holds not only for the binary-symmetric channel