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Results 1 - 10
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2,508
COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA in Finite Games
, 1996
"... We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for niten-person games. Classical path following methods, such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm for two person games, and Scarf-type fixed point algorithms for n-person games provide globally convergent metho ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 147 (1 self)
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We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for niten-person games. Classical path following methods, such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm for two person games, and Scarf-type fixed point algorithms for n-person games provide globally convergent
On the lattice structure of finite games
- More Games of No Chance
"... Abstract. We prove that games born by day n form a distributive lattice, but that the collection of all finite games does not form a lattice. ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 2 (2 self)
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Abstract. We prove that games born by day n form a distributive lattice, but that the collection of all finite games does not form a lattice.
Measuring Permissivity in Finite Games
, 2009
"... In this paper, we extend the classical notion of strategies in turn-based finite games by allowing several moves to be selected. We define and study a quantitative measure for permissivity of such strategies by assigning penalties when blocking transitions. We prove that for reachability objectives ..."
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Cited by 5 (4 self)
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In this paper, we extend the classical notion of strategies in turn-based finite games by allowing several moves to be selected. We define and study a quantitative measure for permissivity of such strategies by assigning penalties when blocking transitions. We prove that for reachability
EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN FINITE GAMES
"... The existence of equilibriu:m points in finite ga:me s, as formulated by von Neu:mann and Morgenstern [11], [6], [7], has been established by Nash [8], [91. The:method of proof is analytic, e:mploying a fixed point argu:ment. We give an algebraic characterization of e quilibriu:m points in Theore:ms ..."
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The existence of equilibriu:m points in finite ga:me s, as formulated by von Neu:mann and Morgenstern [11], [6], [7], has been established by Nash [8], [91. The:method of proof is analytic, e:mploying a fixed point argu:ment. We give an algebraic characterization of e quilibriu:m points in Theore:ms
Equilibrium payoffs in finite games
, 2009
"... We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R 2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it is a finite union of rectangles. Furthermore, we show that ..."
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We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R 2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it is a finite union of rectangles. Furthermore, we show
Reputation and Imperfect Information
- Journal of Economic Theory
, 1982
"... A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that in multistage “games, ” players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being “tough ” or “benevolent ” or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 519 (5 self)
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of finite games, such as Selten’s finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners ’ dilemma. We reexamine Selten’s model, adding to it a “small ” amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players ’ payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise
Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
, 2009
"... Game forms are studied where the acyclicity, in a stronger or weaker sense, of (coalition or individual) improvements is ensured in all derivative games. In every game form generated by an “ordered voting ” procedure, individual improvements converge to Nash equilibria if the players restrict themse ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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Game forms are studied where the acyclicity, in a stronger or weaker sense, of (coalition or individual) improvements is ensured in all derivative games. In every game form generated by an “ordered voting ” procedure, individual improvements converge to Nash equilibria if the players restrict
Equilibria in finite games with imperfect recall. Unpublished manuscript
, 2012
"... Abstract We generalize traditional equilibrium concepts for finite games in extensive form with behavioral strategies so that they apply to all games, including games of imperfect recall. Adapting and augmenting previous definitions (in particular, by Piccione and Rubinstein, and by Battigalli), we ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Abstract We generalize traditional equilibrium concepts for finite games in extensive form with behavioral strategies so that they apply to all games, including games of imperfect recall. Adapting and augmenting previous definitions (in particular, by Piccione and Rubinstein, and by Battigalli
Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
- Games and Economic Behavior
, 2004
"... If in a finite strategic game all strategies are scalar, each player is only affected by the sum of the partners ’ choices, and one of three “single crossing” conditions is satisfied, then every best response improvement path leads to a ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 20 (7 self)
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If in a finite strategic game all strategies are scalar, each player is only affected by the sum of the partners ’ choices, and one of three “single crossing” conditions is satisfied, then every best response improvement path leads to a
Results 1 - 10
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2,508
