We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for niten-person games. Classical path following methods, such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm for two person games, and Scarf-type fixed point algorithms for n-person games provide globally convergent

Abstract. We prove that games born by day n form a distributive lattice, but that the collection of all finite games does not form a lattice.

In this paper, we extend the classical notion of strategies in turn-based finite games by allowing several moves to be selected. We define and study a quantitative measure for permissivity of such strategies by assigning penalties when blocking transitions. We prove that for reachability

The existence of equilibriu:m points in finite ga:me s, as formulated by von Neu:mann and Morgenstern [11], [6], [7], has been established by Nash [8], [91. The:method of proof is analytic, e:mploying a fixed point argu:ment. We give an algebraic characterization of e quilibriu:m points in Theore:ms

We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R 2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it is a finite union of rectangles. Furthermore, we show

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of finite games, such as Selten’s finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners ’ dilemma. We reexamine Selten’s model, adding to it a “small ” amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players ’ payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise

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