The strong bias in favor of domestic securities is a well-documented characteristic of international investment portfolios, yet we show that the preference for investing close to home also applies to portfolios of domestic stocks. Specifically, U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference

rational investors. The model sheds light on a number of financial anomalies, including the excess volatility of asset prices, the mean reversion of stock returns, the underpricing of closed end mutual funds, and the Mehra-Prescott equity premium puzzle. 3“If the reader interjects that there must surely

This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial

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This paper examines whether nancial development facilitates economic growth by scrutinizing one rationale for such a relationship; that nancial development reduces the costs of external nance to rms. Speci cally, we ask whether industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external nance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed nancial markets. We nd this to be true in a large sample of countries over the 1980s. We show this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse causality. (JEL O4, F3, G1) A large literature, dating at least as far back as Joseph A. Schumpeter (1911), emphasizes the positive in uence of the development of a country's nancial sector on the level and the rate of growth of its per capita income. The argument essentially is that the services the nancial sector provides { of reallocating capital to the highest value use without substantial risk of loss through moral hazard, adverse selection, or transactions costs { are an essential catalyst of economic growth. Empirical work seems consistent with this argument. For example, on the

This paper evaluates (1) whether the exogenous component of financial intermediary development influences economic growth and (2) whether cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems (e.g., creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting standards) explain differences

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We study an incentive model of ®nancial intermediation in which ®rms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across ®rms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show that all forms of capital tightening (a credit crunch, a collateral squeeze, or a savings squeeze) hit poorly capitalized ®rms the hardest, but that interest rate effects and the intensity of monitoring will depend on relative changes in the various components of capital. The predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the lending patterns observed during the recent ®nancial crises. I.

), shaped by the firm’s (specific) asset positions (such as the firm’s portfolio of difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and complementary assets), and the evolution path(s) it has adopted or inherited. The importance of path dependencies is amplified where conditions of increasing returns exist. Whether

Indicators of the development of the financial sector do not improve monotonically over time. In particular, we find that by most measures, countries were more financially developed in 1913 than in 1980 and only recently have they surpassed their 1913 levels. This pattern cannot be explained