Executive summary 4

Executive summary 4

Executive summary 4

Executive summary 4

Abstract not found

for unskilled labor is less well developed. This paper applies an understanding of what computers do – the execution of procedural or rules-based logic – to develop and test a simple model of how the widespread adoption of computers in the workplace might alter workplace skill demands. Two essential contentions

This individual differences study examined the separability of three often postu-lated executive functions—mental set shifting (‘‘Shifting’’), information updating and monitoring (‘‘Updating’’), and inhibition of prepotent responses (‘‘Inhibi-tion’’)—and their roles in complex ‘‘frontal lobe

for ad hoc security mechanism. This access control model uses features of role-based access control models to enable: (1) specification of a single role that applies to multiple application instances; (2) selection of a content's access rights based on the content's application and role

Downloading executable content, which enables principals to run programs from remote sites, is a key technology in a number of emerging applications, including collaborative systems, electronic commerce, and web information services. However, the use of downloaded executable content also presents

This paper suggests that the interactions of security trades and quote revisions be modeled as a vector autoregressive system. Within this framework, a trade's information effect may be meaningfully measured as the ultimate price impact of the trade innovation. Estimates for a sample of NYSE issues suggest: a trade's full price impact arrives only with a protracted lag; the impact is a positive and concave function of the trade size; large trades cause the spread to widen; trades occurring in the face of wide spreads have larger price impacts; and, information asymmetries are more significant for smaller firms. CENTRALTO THE ANALYSIS of market microstructure is the notion that in a market with asymmetrically informed agents, trades convey information and therefore cause a persistent impact on the security price. The magnitude of the price effect for a given trade size is generally held to be a positive function of the proportion of potentially informed traders in the population, the probability that such a trader is in fact informed (i.e., the probability that a private information signal has in fact been observed), and the preci-sion of the private information. The close dependence of the price impact on these factors, which may be referred to as the extent of the information asymmetry, provides a strong motivation for the empirical determination of this impact. This paper strives to achieve such a determination in a frame-work that is robust to deviations from the assumptions of the formal models. In the process, the framework establishes a rich characterization of the dynamics by which trades and quotes interact. The market considered here is a specialist market in which a designated market-maker exposes bid and ask quotes to the trading public. An extensive theory has evolved that analyzes the market-maker's exposure to traders with superior information. ' Concerning the extent of the information asym-metry, this body of theory yields two important empirical predictions: first,