Abstract: Excess capacity results because fishermen do not have an incentive to conserve fish in-the-sea causing them to 1 over-invest in the capital used to harvest fish as well as other production or factor inputs. Excess capacity like overcapitalization and overfishing is a symptom of our

Our purpose is to study a model of the behavior of a cartel. There are a number of reasons why this is an interesting exercise. Whenever they have not been outlawed, cartels have existed, and frequently flourished, in a wide variety of industries. Their modes of operation have been diverse, and their longevity

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Commercial lettuce, grown principally in the West, is produced continuously throughout the year but in different areas with growing periods of various lengths. These various growing periods are due to different seasonal climatological patterns among producing areas. Weekly lettuce shipments are generally dominated by a few growers or grower-shippers with large acreages. Shippers have control over 85 percent of all lettuce planted for some harvesting periods and 65 percent for others, through coordination arrangements with growers. Due to the perishable (non-storable) nature of lettuce, the amount harvested is the amount shipped to consumption centers. The lettuce subsector appears to behave in a coercive (predatory) manner. This conduct is evident in the long periods of relatively low prices and the short periods of high lettuce prices experienced in the subsector. Lettuce prices are characterized by wide intraseasonal variation largely because of an increasing overlap of harvest periods among producing areas, production expansion to new areas, and weather conditions. The outcomes are the short-run surpluses or deficits experienced by the subsector. This market instability in turn causes farmer and shipper income instability. The lack of adequate information about lettuce acreage planted each week contributes to additional uncertainty regarding the decision grow-ers and shippers make about lettuce acreage to be planted at a given time in a particular area. Inade-quate information on acres planted, compounded with the uncertainty of weather patterns, becomes a major problem in attempting to decrease the

Abstract This paper discusses the reason of firm excess capacity in China in the aspect of marketization under government regulation, by using the data from World Bank China-enterprise survey 2012 to do empirical study of the relationship between obstacle of accessing land, land marketization

Excess capacity is observed in many markets especially those where a substantial initial investment is required. The theoretical literature often explains this feature by strategic attempts to deter entry or to limit new entrants ’ market shares but the empirical evidence for such a rationale

are typically limited in resources such as bandwidth, computation power and memory. Capacity limitation is one of the fundamental issues in wireless networks. Excess capacity(EC) is the unused capacity. Here in this paper EC Management techniques are used to improve network performance. In this approach a

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence of moves

Abstract: While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence

We analyze the capacity choice of firms in a long−run mixed oligopoly market, in which firms decide not only production quantity but also capacity scale. Our main purpose is to show that while a profit−maximizing firm maintains over capacity as a strategic device, a firm pursuing non−pure profit