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3,428
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 563 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
Conditional Equilibrium Outcomes via Ascending Price Processes
"... A Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with nonidentical indivisible items exists only for small classes of players’ valuations (mostly “gross substitutes” valuations), and may not generally exist even with decreasing marginal values. This paper studies a relaxed notion, “conditional equilibrium”, t ..."
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Cited by 13 (4 self)
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”, that requires individual rationality and “outward stability”, i.e., a player will not want to add items to her allocation, at given prices. While a Walrasian equilibrium outcome is unconditionally stable, a conditional equilibrium outcome is stable if players cannot choose to drop only some of their allocated
Rational Expectations Equilibrium Outcomes from
, 2012
"... Attainment of rational expectations equilibria in asset markets calls for the price system to disseminate traders ’ private information to others. It is known that markets populated by asymmetricallyinformed profitmotivated human traders can converge to rational expectations equilibria. This paper ..."
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. This paper reports comparable market outcomes when human traders are replaced by boundedlyrational algorithmic agents who use a simple meansend heuristic. These algorithmic agents lack the capability to optimize; yet outcomes of markets populated by them converge near the equilibrium derived from
Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy
 JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
, 1983
"... In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect. But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymakor's incentives and form their ..."
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Cited by 812 (9 self)
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the policymaker and the private agents, it is possible that reputational forces can substitute for formal rules. Here, we develop an example of a reputational equilibrium where the outcomes turn out to be weighted averages of those from discretion and those from the ideal rule. In particular, the rates
On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms
"... Consider nonempty finite pure strategy sets S 1 ; : : : ; Sn , let S = S 1 \Theta : : : \Theta Sn , let\Omega be a finite space of "outcomes," let \Delta(\Omega\Gamma be the set of probability distributions on \Omega\Gamma and let ` : S ! \Delta(\Omega\Gamma be a function. We study the c ..."
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Cited by 10 (2 self)
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of the conjecture follow from well known theorems, and we provide some generalizations of these results. On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms by Srihari Govindan and Andrew McLennan 1. Introduction This paper studies a class of conjectures concerning the generic
The WALRAS algorithm: A convergent distributed implementation of general equilibrium outcomes
 Computational Economics
, 1998
"... Abstract. The WALRAS algorithm calculates competitive equilibria via a distributed tatonnementlike process, in which agents submit singlegood demand functions to marketclearing auctions. The algorithm is asynchronous and decentralized with respect to both agents and markets, making it suitable for ..."
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Cited by 113 (11 self)
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for distributed implementation. We present a formal description of this algorithm, and prove that it converges under the standard assumption of gross substitutability. We relate our results to the literature on general equilibrium stability and some more recent work on decentralized algorithms. We present some
INFLATIONOUTPUT TRADEOFF AS EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOME OF GLOBALIZATION
"... The paper provides an integrated analysis of globalization effects on the inflationoutput tradeoff and monetary policy in the NewKeynesian framework. The prediction of the analysis is threefold. First, labor, goods, and capital mobility flatten the Phillips curve, the tradeoff between inflation an ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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and activity. Second, the same globalization forces lead the welfarebased monetary policy to be more aggressive with regard to inflation fluctuations, and at the same time, more benign with respect to the outputgap fluctuations. Third, the equilibrium response of inflation to supply and demand shocks is more
Abstract InflationOutput Tradeoff as Equilibrium Outcome of Globalization
, 2008
"... The paper provides an integrated analysis of globalization effects on the inflationoutput tradeoff and monetary policy in the NewKeynesian framework. The prediction of the analysis is threefold. First, labor, goods, and capital mobility flatten the Phillips curve, the tradeoff between inflation an ..."
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and activity. Second, the same globalization forces lead the welfarebased monetary policy to be more aggressive with regard to inflation fluctuations, and at the same time, more benign with respect to the outputgap fluctuations. Third, the equilibrium response of inflation to supply and demand shocks is more
Implementability of Correlated and Communication Equilibrium Outcomes in Incomplete Information Games
, 2009
"... In a correlated equilibrium, the players ’ choice of actions is affected by random, correlated messages that they receive from an outside source, or mechanism. This allows for more equilibrium outcomes than without such messages (purestrategy equilibrium) or with statistically independent ones (mix ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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In a correlated equilibrium, the players ’ choice of actions is affected by random, correlated messages that they receive from an outside source, or mechanism. This allows for more equilibrium outcomes than without such messages (purestrategy equilibrium) or with statistically independent ones
Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions for SenderReceiver CheapTalk Games
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 1997
"... This paper establishes the generic niteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for SenderReceiver cheaptalk games. An equilibrium in a SenderReceiver cheaptalk game is said to be in reduced form if every message is used by at least one type and no two messages provoke the same response. It is ..."
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Cited by 9 (2 self)
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This paper establishes the generic niteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for SenderReceiver cheaptalk games. An equilibrium in a SenderReceiver cheaptalk game is said to be in reduced form if every message is used by at least one type and no two messages provoke the same response
Results 1  10
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