-voked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary value. 1 Intuition and Epistemic Self-Defeat

cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification

is an attempt to show that the very sort of meta-epistemological theorizing needed to articulate and establish epistemic expressivism involves the epistemic expressivist in some sort of internal incoherence or self-defeat. That is, they think that articulating or defending the position requires implicit

much. Non-conformists disagree. Do you see a problem? Brian Weatherson argues that conformism is self-defeating given all the non-conformists. Weatherson’s essay combines a widely cited 2007 blog-post-turned-manuscript with some formal afterthoughts. See also Plantinga (2000) for an earlier statement

Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that the demand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair or question-begging one. 1. The Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism I am a

doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-098-7-103

studies are a historical counter example of the mainstream model of disciplinarization in the social sciences. Notwithstanding these important issues, the challenge with which we are confronted is that of understanding the current state of communication studies, a state of development that seems to defeat