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100
Epistemically Self-defeating Arguments and Skepticism about Intuition
, 2012
"... An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have in-voked considerations ..."
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-voked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary value. 1 Intuition and Epistemic Self-Defeat
Evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification
- Dialectica
, 2011
"... What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cogni ..."
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Cited by 4 (3 self)
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cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification
An epistemic logic for update semantics – *
"... For convenience, “if…then… ” and “if and only if ” are usually abbreviated to ⇒ and ⇔, respectively. First we give some basic facts about set theory, which they are often used since: Lemma 1.1 Let S, T and U be sets. Then ..."
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For convenience, “if…then… ” and “if and only if ” are usually abbreviated to ⇒ and ⇔, respectively. First we give some basic facts about set theory, which they are often used since: Lemma 1.1 Let S, T and U be sets. Then
1 Sosa on Epistemic Value
"... 0. In this characteristically rich and insightful paper, Ernest Sosa offers us a compelling account of epistemic normativity and, in the process, of the value of knowledge. Rather than summarise the argument of the paper as a whole, let me instead pick out those theses that Sosa argues for which are ..."
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0. In this characteristically rich and insightful paper, Ernest Sosa offers us a compelling account of epistemic normativity and, in the process, of the value of knowledge. Rather than summarise the argument of the paper as a whole, let me instead pick out those theses that Sosa argues for which
The Epistemic Relevance of the Virtue of Justice
, 2013
"... Abstract Recent literature on the relationship between knowledge and justice has tended to focus exclusively on the social and ethical dimensions of this relationship (e.g. social injustices related to knowledge and power, etc.). For the purposes of this article, I am interested in examining the vir ..."
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the virtue of justice and its effects on the cognitive faculties of its possessor (and, correspondingly, the effects of the vice of injustice). Drawing upon Thomas Aquinas’s account of the virtue of justice, I argue that in certain cases justice can be a criterion of epistemic evaluation and that it deserves
Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor *
"... Because of its complexity, contemporary scientific research is almost always tackled by groups of scientists, each of which works in a different part of a given research domain. We believe that understanding scientific progress thus requires understanding this division of cognitive labor. To this en ..."
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Cited by 19 (0 self)
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. To this end, we present a novel agent-based model of scientific research in which scientists divide their labor to explore an unknown epistemic landscape. Scientists aim to climb uphill in this landscape, where elevation represents the significance of the results discovered by employing a research approach
Epistemic Probability Logic Simplified
"... We propose a logic for reasoning about (multi-agent) epistemic probability models, and for epistemic probabilistic model check-ing. Epistemic probability models are multi-agent Kripke models that assign to each agent an equivalence relation on worlds, to-gether with function from worlds to positive ..."
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We propose a logic for reasoning about (multi-agent) epistemic probability models, and for epistemic probabilistic model check-ing. Epistemic probability models are multi-agent Kripke models that assign to each agent an equivalence relation on worlds, to-gether with function from worlds to positive
Metareasoning for multi-agent epistemic logics
- In CLIMA V
, 2004
"... Abstract. We present an encoding of a sequent calculus for a multiagent epistemic logic in Athena, an interactive theorem proving system for many-sorted first-order logic. We then use Athena as a metalanguage in order to reason about the multi-agent logic an as object language. This facilitates theo ..."
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Cited by 13 (9 self)
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Abstract. We present an encoding of a sequent calculus for a multiagent epistemic logic in Athena, an interactive theorem proving system for many-sorted first-order logic. We then use Athena as a metalanguage in order to reason about the multi-agent logic an as object language. This facilitates
0 IS EPISTEMIC EXPRESSIVISM INCOMPATIBLE WITH INQUIRY?1 forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
, 2011
"... Expressivist views of an area of discourse encourage us to ask not about the nature of the relevant kinds of values but rather about the nature of the relevant kind of evaluations. Their answer to the latter question typically claims some interesting disanalogy between those kinds of evaluations and ..."
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is an attempt to show that the very sort of meta-epistemological theorizing needed to articulate and establish epistemic expressivism involves the epistemic expressivist in some sort of internal incoherence or self-defeat. That is, they think that articulating or defending the position requires implicit
Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism
"... Abstract Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that agents do not always believe, let alone know, the consequences of what they know
Results 1 - 10
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100
