Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption

Abstract. This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented

Differential Power Analysis, first introduced by Kocher et al. in [14], is a powerful technique allowing to recover secret smart card information by monitoring power signals. In [14] a specific DPA attack against smart-cards running the DES algorithm was described. As few as 1000 encryptions were

Abstract. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a powerful cryptanalytic technique aiming at extracting secret data from a cryptographic device by collecting power consumption traces and averaging over a series of acquisitions. In order to prevent the leakage, hardware designers and software

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-entific research documents, whether they are pub-lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et a ̀ la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Observability of Stuck-at-Faults

analysis [6], [7] of weaknesses of stream cipher constructions. In this paper we present attacks on two focus candidates, Trivium and Grain, of the eSTREAM stream cipher project. The attacks exploit the resynchronization phase of ciphers. A novel concept for choosing initial value vectors is introduced

. For both stream ciphers we are able to reveal the complete key. Keywords: side-channel attack, power analysis, DPA, stream cipher, Trivium, Grain. 1

Abstract CMOS gates consume different amounts of power whether their output has a falling or a rising edge. Therefore the overall power consumption of a CMOS circuit leaks information about the activity of every single gate. This explains why, using differential power analysis (DPA), one can infer

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x given some element y = gx of G. The discrete logarithm problem overan EC seems to be much harder than in other groups such as the multiplicative