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1GOSSIB vs. IP Traceback Rumors

by Marcel Waldvogel
"... Abstract—To identify sources of distributed denial-of-service at-tacks, path traceback mechanisms have been proposed. Traceback mechanisms relying on probabilistic packet marking (PPM) have received most attention, as they are easy to implement and deploy incrementally. In this paper, we introduce a ..."
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Abstract—To identify sources of distributed denial-of-service at-tacks, path traceback mechanisms have been proposed. Traceback mechanisms relying on probabilistic packet marking (PPM) have received most attention, as they are easy to implement and deploy incrementally. In this paper, we introduce

Crash fault detection in celerating environments

by Srikanth Sastry, Scott M. Pike, Jennifer L. Welch - In Intl. Par. and Distrib. Proc. Symp , 2009
"... Failure detectors are a service that provides (ap-proximate) information about process crashes in a dis-tributed system. The well-known “eventually perfect” failure detector, 3P, has been implemented in partially synchronous systems with unknown upper bounds on message delay and relative process spe ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
implementations of 3P ro-bust to process celeration, which can result from hard-ware upgrades, server overloads, denial-of-service at-tacks, and other system volatilities. 1

B.: From onions to shallots: Rewarding Tor relays with TEARS. In: HotPETS

by Rob Jansen, Andrew Miller, Paul Syverson, Bryan Ford , 2014
"... Abstract. The Tor anonymity network depends on volunteers to oper-ate relays, and might offer higher bandwidth with lower response laten-cies if more users could be incentivized to contribute relay bandwidth. We introduce TEARS, a system rewarding useful service with traffic prior-ity. TEARS audits ..."
Abstract - Cited by 2 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
them auditable while naturally distributing bank functionality and associated overhead. Further, these distributed banking protocols resist denial-of-service at-tacks and can recover from catastrophic failures. TEARS may either be deployed in the existing Tor network or operate alongside it. 1

A Distributed Denial-of-Service Defense System Using

by Leaky-bucket-based Packetscore
"... Abstract. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have been a big threat to the Internet while no effective schemes have been proposed or deployed, leaving the Internet still vulnerable to such attacks. We propose a proactive DDoS defense scheme [Ki04] by having multiple routers form a defense ..."
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Abstract. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have been a big threat to the Internet while no effective schemes have been proposed or deployed, leaving the Internet still vulnerable to such attacks. We propose a proactive DDoS defense scheme [Ki04] by having multiple routers form a defense

A New Mechanism for Improving Robustness of TCP against Pulsing Denial-of-Service Attacks

by Hiroshi Tsunoda, Kenjirou Arai, Nei Kato, Yoshiaki Nemoto
"... Abstract: In this paper, we propose a new mechanism to combat pulsing Denial-of-Service (DoS) at-tacks. Pulsing DoS attacks can seriously degrade the throughput of legitimate TCP flows in a stealthy manner. The attacker send periodic short bursts of traffic (i.e. pulses) to cause packet losses of TC ..."
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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a new mechanism to combat pulsing Denial-of-Service (DoS) at-tacks. Pulsing DoS attacks can seriously degrade the throughput of legitimate TCP flows in a stealthy manner. The attacker send periodic short bursts of traffic (i.e. pulses) to cause packet losses

Analysis of a denial of service attack on TCP

by Christoph L. Schuba, Ivan V. Krsul, Markus G. Kuhn, Eugene H. Spafford, Aurobindo Sundaram, Diego Zamboni - In Proc. of the 1997 IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy , 1997
"... This paper analyzes a network-based denial of service at-tack for IP (Internet Protocol) based networks. It is popu-larly called SYN flooding. It works by an attacker sending many TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connection re-quests with spoofed source addresses to a victim’s machine. Each reque ..."
Abstract - Cited by 142 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper analyzes a network-based denial of service at-tack for IP (Internet Protocol) based networks. It is popu-larly called SYN flooding. It works by an attacker sending many TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connection re-quests with spoofed source addresses to a victim’s machine. Each

Denial of service? leave it to Beaver

by Gal Badishi, Amir Herzberg, Idit Keidar, Oleg Romanov, Avital Yachin , 2006
"... We present Beaver, a method and architecture to “build dams ” to protect servers from Denial of Service (DoS) at-tacks. Beaver allows efficient filtering of DoS traffic using low-cost, high-performance, readily-available packet filter-ing mechanisms. Beaver improves on previous solutions by not requ ..."
Abstract - Cited by 2 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
We present Beaver, a method and architecture to “build dams ” to protect servers from Denial of Service (DoS) at-tacks. Beaver allows efficient filtering of DoS traffic using low-cost, high-performance, readily-available packet filter-ing mechanisms. Beaver improves on previous solutions

Denial of Service Protection with Beaver

by Gal Badishi, Amir Herzberg, Idit Keidar, Oleg Romanov, Avital Yachin
"... We present Beaver, a method and architecture to “build dams ” to protect servers from Denial of Service (DoS) at-tacks. Beaver allows efficient filtering of DoS traffic using low-cost, high-performance, readily-available packet filter-ing mechanisms. Beaver improves on previous solutions by not requ ..."
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We present Beaver, a method and architecture to “build dams ” to protect servers from Denial of Service (DoS) at-tacks. Beaver allows efficient filtering of DoS traffic using low-cost, high-performance, readily-available packet filter-ing mechanisms. Beaver improves on previous solutions

Detecting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS

by Sanguk Noh, Cheolho Lee, Kyunghee Choi, Gihyun Jung - Attacks through Inductive Learning. Lecture Notes in Computer Science , 2003
"... Abstract. As the complexity of Internet is scaled up, it is likely for the Internet resources to be exposed to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding at-tacks on TCP-based Web servers. There has been a lot of related work which focuses on analyzing the pattern of the DDoS attacks to protect u ..."
Abstract - Cited by 18 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. As the complexity of Internet is scaled up, it is likely for the Internet resources to be exposed to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding at-tacks on TCP-based Web servers. There has been a lot of related work which focuses on analyzing the pattern of the DDoS attacks to protect

Computer Simulation of Denial of Service attack in Military Information Network using

by Lichun Pei, Chenhui Li, Runfeng Hou, Yanjun Zhang, Hongyan Ou
"... Abstract. According to designing DoS attack model, the methods based on OPNET of simulating DoS attack which can be achieved are summarized. The at-tack model is given from simulating SYN flood attack. Simulation results show that the network simulation is a productive approach to analyze and estima ..."
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Abstract. According to designing DoS attack model, the methods based on OPNET of simulating DoS attack which can be achieved are summarized. The at-tack model is given from simulating SYN flood attack. Simulation results show that the network simulation is a productive approach to analyze
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