of the project. I also would like to thank my research assistant, Shah Rizan Abdul Aziz, who has spent an enormous amount of time in designing and development the cryptographic library. He also spent a considerable amount of time in preparing this report, thank you again. Last but not least, I wish to thank my

With the development of provable security techniques, cryptographers have seen tension arise between what is practical and what can be proven. In particular, the use of simulation to prove security of protocols against malicious parties requires that "special powers" be available

We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols

(in count and length) have no simple pattern, their disorder is reminiscent of primes. We suggest some intriguing cryptographic applications based on the poor predictability of the next element in each series, combined with good predictability of the computational load to develop the series (by

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We present general definitions of security for multi-party cryptographic protocols, with focus on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these definitions, security is preserved under a natural composition operation

We present a new automatic cryptographic protocol verifier based on a simple representation of the protocol by Prolog rules, and on a new efficient algorithm that determines whether a fact can be proved from these rules or not. This verifier proves secrecy properties of the protocols. Thanks to its

suggests ways to solve these currently open problems. It also discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.

nodes. DSNs may be deployed in hostile areas where communication is monitored and nodes are subject to capture and surreptitious use by an adversary. Hence DSNs require cryptographic protection of communications, sensorcapture detection, key revocation and sensor disabling. In this paper, we present a

. 1. Introduction The importance of cryptographic techniques in a wide range of network s...