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On cryptographic assumptions and challenges
 in Proceedings of IACR CRYPTO
, 2003
"... Abstract. We deal with computational assumptions needed in order to design secure cryptographic schemes. We suggest a classi£cation of such assumptions based on the complexity of falsifying them (in case they happen not to be true) by creating a challenge (competition) to their validity. As an outco ..."
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Cited by 78 (4 self)
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Abstract. We deal with computational assumptions needed in order to design secure cryptographic schemes. We suggest a classi£cation of such assumptions based on the complexity of falsifying them (in case they happen not to be true) by creating a challenge (competition) to their validity
Cryptographic Assumptions: A Position Paper
"... The mission of theoretical cryptography is to dene and construct provably secure cryptographic protocols and schemes. Without proofs of security, cryptographic constructs offer no guarantees whatsoever and no basis for evaluation and comparison. As most security proofs necessarily come in the form ..."
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is accepted as a reasonable cryptographic assumption can be harmful to the credibility of our eld. Therefore, there is a great need for measures according to which we classify and compare assumptions, as to which are safe and which are not. In this paper, we propose such a classication and review recently
New Cryptosystem Using Multiple Cryptographic Assumptions
"... Abstract: Problem statement: A cryptosystem is a way for a sender and a receiver to communicate digitally by which the sender can send receiver any confidential or private message by first encrypting it using the receiver’s public key. Upon receiving the encrypted message, the receiver can confirm t ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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the originality of the message’s contents using his own secret key. Up to now, most of the existing cryptosystems were developed based on a single cryptographic assumption like factoring, discrete logarithms, quadratic residue or elliptic curve discrete logarithm. Although these schemes remain secure today, one
Oblivious RAMs without Cryptographic Assumptions 1
"... Abstract. We show that oblivious online simulation with only polylogarithmic increase in the time and space requirements is possible on a probabilistic (coin flipping) RAM without using any cryptographic assumptions. The simulation will fail with a negligible probability. If n memory locations are ..."
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Abstract. We show that oblivious online simulation with only polylogarithmic increase in the time and space requirements is possible on a probabilistic (coin flipping) RAM without using any cryptographic assumptions. The simulation will fail with a negligible probability. If n memory locations
Automated analysis of cryptographic assumptions in generic group models
 In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2014, LNCS
, 2014
"... Abstract. We initiate the study of principled, automated, methods for analyzing hardness assumptions in generic group models, following the approach of symbolic cryptography. We start by defining a broad class of generic and symbolic group models for different settings—symmetric or asymmetric (level ..."
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Cited by 6 (3 self)
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Abstract. We initiate the study of principled, automated, methods for analyzing hardness assumptions in generic group models, following the approach of symbolic cryptography. We start by defining a broad class of generic and symbolic group models for different settings—symmetric or asymmetric
On the Analysis of Cryptographic Assumptions in the Generic Ring Model ∗
, 2009
"... At Eurocrypt 2009 Aggarwal and Maurer proved that breaking RSA is equivalent to factoring in the generic ring model. This model captures algorithms that may exploit the full algebraic structure of the ring of integers modulo n, but no properties of the given representation of ring elements. This int ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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At Eurocrypt 2009 Aggarwal and Maurer proved that breaking RSA is equivalent to factoring in the generic ring model. This model captures algorithms that may exploit the full algebraic structure of the ring of integers modulo n, but no properties of the given representation of ring elements. This interesting result raises the question how to interpret proofs in the generic ring model. For instance, one may be tempted to deduce that a proof in the generic model gives some evidence that solving the considered problem is also hard in a general model of computation. But is this reasonable? We prove that computing the Jacobi symbol is equivalent to factoring in the generic ring model. Since there are simple and efficient nongeneric algorithms computing the Jacobi symbol, we show that the generic model cannot give any evidence towards the hardness of a computational problem. Despite this negative result, we also argue why proofs in the generic ring model are still interesting, and show that solving the quadratic residuosity and subgroup decision problems is generically equivalent to factoring. 1
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus
 Information and Computation
, 1999
"... We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the ..."
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Cited by 919 (55 self)
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We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols
Security and Composition of Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols
 JOURNAL OF CRYPTOLOGY
, 1998
"... We present general definitions of security for multiparty cryptographic protocols, with focus on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these definitions, security is preserved under a natural composition operation. The definiti ..."
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Cited by 465 (19 self)
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We present general definitions of security for multiparty cryptographic protocols, with focus on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these definitions, security is preserved under a natural composition operation
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
 Proc. IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy
, 1994
"... We present principles for the design of cryptographic protocols. The principles are neither necessary nor sufficient for correctness. They are however helpful, in that adherence to them would have avoided a considerable number of published errors. Our principles are informal guidelines. They complem ..."
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Cited by 405 (17 self)
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We present principles for the design of cryptographic protocols. The principles are neither necessary nor sufficient for correctness. They are however helpful, in that adherence to them would have avoided a considerable number of published errors. Our principles are informal guidelines
Bounded Waitfree Implementation of Optimally Resilient Byzantine Storage without (Unproven) Cryptographic Assumptions
 In DISC ’07
, 2007
"... We present the first optimally resilient, bounded, waitfree implementation of a replicated register providing atomic semantics in a system in which readers can be Byzantine, up to f servers (n ≥ (3f + 1)) are subject to Byzantine failures and servers do not communicate with each other. Unlike previ ..."
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Cited by 13 (2 self)
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Byzantine readers, information theoretically, without the use of cryptographic techniques based on unproven numbertheoretic assumptions. 1 1
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