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716
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING
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Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 222024302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE
IMPLEMENTATION WITH CONTINGENT CONTRACTS
"... The copyright to this Article is held by the Econometric Society. It may be downloaded, printed and reproduced only for educational or research purposes, including use in course packs. No downloading or copying may be done for any commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the Econometric ..."
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The copyright to this Article is held by the Econometric Society. It may be downloaded, printed and reproduced only for educational or research purposes, including use in course packs. No downloading or copying may be done for any commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the Econometric Society. For such commercial purposes contact the Office of the Econometric Society (contact information may be found at the website
* ARMY CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING
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b"." " ",%"' " "" "... 'r ",. ¢ ' 'o ";".". "'"" '.' " '"q,'.. ":'._4"L,. *, * "".*".5* ' *..*, *.',* * ew
Collateral Constraints and StateContingent Contracts
"... It is commonly assumed that binding collateral constraints amplify the impact of aggregate shocks on the economy. However, we show that when firms can hedge against aggregate risk with statecontingent lending contracts, binding collateral constraints no longer amplify shocks relative to the basic ..."
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It is commonly assumed that binding collateral constraints amplify the impact of aggregate shocks on the economy. However, we show that when firms can hedge against aggregate risk with statecontingent lending contracts, binding collateral constraints no longer amplify shocks relative to the basic
Optimal TimeContingent Contract Design
, 2009
"... This paper studies a contract design problem in a setting where time clauses are important. A principal hires an agent to complete a project within a fixed time horizon and prefers to have the project done as early as possible. The agent whose e¤ort is not contractible has a tendency to shirk and ..."
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and to delay exerting effort. We show that in the principal’s optimal contract, deadlines and payment schemes can be used jointly as effective instruments to motivate the agent to exert e¤ort and to avoid delay so that a better outcome can be achieved for the principal. Specifically, if a timecontingent wage
Banking with Contingent Contracts, Macroeconomic Risks, and Banking Crises∗
"... We examine banking competition when deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks become feasible. We show that the risk allocation is efficient, provided that banks are not bailed out. In this case, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors. The private sector insures the banki ..."
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We examine banking competition when deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks become feasible. We show that the risk allocation is efficient, provided that banks are not bailed out. In this case, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors. The private sector insures
Contingency Contracting Guide/Lessons for Navy Contracting Officers
, 2004
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK i
30 Seconds or Free! Contingent Contracts in Electronic Commerce ∗
, 2002
"... We gratefully acknowledge Kalyan Chaterjee and Vidyanand Choudhary for providing useful comments ..."
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We gratefully acknowledge Kalyan Chaterjee and Vidyanand Choudhary for providing useful comments
Corrected Proof of Lemma 2 in “Implementation with Contingent Contracts”
, 2015
"... There is a mistake in the proof of Lemma 2 (the statement of which is correct) in Deb and Mishra (2014) the partition created in Lemma 2 is not fordered partitioned as claimed. We are very grateful to Kiho Yoon who brought this error to our attention. Below is the corrected proof of Lemma 2. Lemma ..."
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There is a mistake in the proof of Lemma 2 (the statement of which is correct) in Deb and Mishra (2014) the partition created in Lemma 2 is not fordered partitioned as claimed. We are very grateful to Kiho Yoon who brought this error to our attention. Below is the corrected proof of Lemma 2. Lemma 2: Suppose the type space is finite and f is an acyclic scf. Then, the type space can be fordered partitioned. Corrected Proof: We define a new relation Bf as follows: for every vi, v′i, we say vi Bf v′i if there is a finite sequence {v1i,..., vki} such that vi ≡ v1i f v2i f... f vki ≡ v′i, with at least one of the above relations strict (f). Now, we do the proof in several steps. Step 1. First, we show that Bf is acyclic. Consider a sequence v1i,..., vki such that v1i Bf... Bf vki. Assume for contradiction vki Bf v1i. So, we get v1i Bf... Bf vki Bf vk+1i ≡ v1i. Between any consecutive types vji and v j+1 i in this sequence, we have v j i f... f vj+1i, with strict relation holding for at least one. Hence, we get a finite sequence v1i f... f vk+1i ≡ v1i with strict relation holding for at least one. Acyclicity of f implies that v1i f v1i, contradicting the reflexivity of f. Step 2. Next, choose any nonempty subset V ′i ⊆ Vi, and let M(V ′i) ⊆ V ′i be the set of maximal elements of V ′i corresponding to the relation Bf. Formally M(V ′i): = {vi  vi ∈ V ′i and there is no v′i ∈ V ′i such that v′i Bf vi}. Since Bf is acyclic, M(V ′i) is nonempty. Step 2(a). v′i f vi for every vi, v′i ∈ M(V ′i). To see this, if v′i f vi, then v′i Bf vi, contradicting vi ∈M(V ′i). Step 2(b). v′i f vi for every vi ∈M(V ′i) and every v′i ∈ (V ′i \M(V ′i)). Assume for contradiction v′i f vi. Since v′i / ∈ M(V ′i), there exists a v′′i such that v′′i Bf v′i. Hence, there is a
Endogenous Uncertainty in a General Equilibrium Model with Price Contingent Contracts
 Economic Theory
, 1996
"... Summary. This paper views uncertainty and economic fluctuations as being primarily endogenous and internally propagated phenomena. The most important Endogenous Uncertainty examined in this paper is price uncertainty which arises when agents do not have structural knowledge and are compelled to make ..."
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Cited by 20 (10 self)
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to make decisions on the basis of their beliefs. We assume that agents adopt Rational Beliefs as in Kurz [1994a]. The trading of endogenous uncertainty is accomplished by using Price Contingent Contracts (PCC) rather than the ArrowDebreu state contingent contracts. The paper provides a full construction
Results 1  10
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