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Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complementfree bidders
 In Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC
, 2005
"... We exhibit three approximation algorithms for the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with complement free bidders. The running time of these algorithms is polynomial in the number of items m and in the number of bidders n, even though the “input size ” is exponential in m. The first algori ..."
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Cited by 133 (25 self)
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We exhibit three approximation algorithms for the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with complement free bidders. The running time of these algorithms is polynomial in the number of items m and in the number of bidders n, even though the “input size ” is exponential in m. The first
DOI 10.1287/moor.xxxx.xxxx c○20xx INFORMS Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with ComplementFree Bidders
"... In a combinatorial auction m heterogenous indivisible items are sold to n bidders. This paper considers settings in which the valuation functions of the bidders are known to be complementfree (a.k.a. subadditive). We provide several approximation algorithms for the socialwelfare maximization probl ..."
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In a combinatorial auction m heterogenous indivisible items are sold to n bidders. This paper considers settings in which the valuation functions of the bidders are known to be complementfree (a.k.a. subadditive). We provide several approximation algorithms for the socialwelfare maximization
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers
 American Economic Review
, 1986
"... The interests and incentives of managers and shareholders conflict over such issues as the optimal size of the firm and the payment of cash to shareholders. These conflicts are especially severe in firms with large free cash flows—more cash than profitable investment opportunities. The theory develo ..."
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Cited by 2311 (11 self)
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The interests and incentives of managers and shareholders conflict over such issues as the optimal size of the firm and the payment of cash to shareholders. These conflicts are especially severe in firms with large free cash flows—more cash than profitable investment opportunities. The theory
Ontology Learning for the Semantic Web
 IEEE Intelligent Systems
, 2001
"... The Semantic Web relies heavily on the formal ontologies that structure underlying data for the purpose of comprehensive and transportable machine understanding. Therefore, the success of the Semantic Web depends strongly on the proliferation of ontologies, which requires fast and easy engineering o ..."
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Cited by 492 (16 self)
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. Besides of the general framework and architecture, we show in this paper some exemplary techniques in the ontology learning cycle that we have implemented in our ontology learning environment, TextToOnto, such as ontology learning from free text, from dictionaries, or from legacy ontologies, and refer
A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder Returns
 Journal of Financial Economics
, 1991
"... We develop a measure of free cash flow using Tobin’s q to distinguish between firms that hav,e good investment opportunities and those that do not. In a sample of successful tender offers, bidder returns are significantly negatively related to cash flow for low q bidders but not for high q bidders: ..."
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Cited by 155 (6 self)
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We develop a measure of free cash flow using Tobin’s q to distinguish between firms that hav,e good investment opportunities and those that do not. In a sample of successful tender offers, bidder returns are significantly negatively related to cash flow for low q bidders but not for high q bidders
MultipleObject Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
 Rev. Econ. Stud
, 2001
"... A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a ..."
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Cited by 82 (0 self)
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A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means
EnvyFree Allocations for Budgeted Bidders
"... We study the problem of identifying prices to support a given allocation of items to bidders in an envyfree way. A bidder will envy another bidder if she would prefer to obtain the other bidder’s item at the price paid by that bidder. Envyfree prices for allocations have been studied extensively; ..."
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Cited by 9 (0 self)
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We study the problem of identifying prices to support a given allocation of items to bidders in an envyfree way. A bidder will envy another bidder if she would prefer to obtain the other bidder’s item at the price paid by that bidder. Envyfree prices for allocations have been studied extensively
Email as spectroscopy: Automated discovery of community structure within organizations
, 2003
"... Abstract. We describe a methodology for the automatic identification of communities of practice from email logs within an organization. We use a betweenness centrality algorithm that can rapidly find communities within a graph representing information flows. We apply this algorithm to an email corpu ..."
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Cited by 205 (7 self)
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corpus of nearly one million messages collected over a twomonth span, and show that the method is effective at identifying true communities, both formal and informal, within these scalefree graphs. This approach also enables the identification of leadership roles within the communities. These studies
PriorFree Auctions with Ordered Bidders
"... Priorfree auctions are robust auctions that assume no distribution over bidders ’ valuations and provide worstcase (inputbyinput) approximation guarantees. In contrast to previous work on this topic, we pursue good priorfree auctions with nonidentical bidders. Priorfree auctions can approxima ..."
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Cited by 7 (2 self)
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Priorfree auctions are robust auctions that assume no distribution over bidders ’ valuations and provide worstcase (inputbyinput) approximation guarantees. In contrast to previous work on this topic, we pursue good priorfree auctions with nonidentical bidders. Priorfree auctions can
Dynamic Pricing for Impatient Bidders
"... We study the following problem related to pricing over time. Assume there is a collection of bidders, each of whom is interested in buying a copy of an item of which there is an unlimited supply. Every bidder is associated with a time interval over which the bidder will consider buying a copy of the ..."
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Cited by 11 (1 self)
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with the optimal offline solution. The gap between the upper and lower bounds is quadratic. We also consider the envy free model in which bidders are sold the item at the minimum price during their bid interval, as long as it is not over their limit value. We prove tight bounds on the competitiveness
Results 1  10
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