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864,204
Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics
, 1997
"... This paper provides sufficient conditions to draw strict monotone comparative statics conclusions in optimization problems. These results extend the latticetheoretic results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) by imposing a stronger differential version of the single crossing property and arguing from fi ..."
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Cited by 253 (1 self)
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This paper provides sufficient conditions to draw strict monotone comparative statics conclusions in optimization problems. These results extend the latticetheoretic results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) by imposing a stronger differential version of the single crossing property and arguing from
The Comparative Statics of Collusion Models ∗
, 2006
"... develop and illustrate a methodology for obtaining robust comparative statics results for colWe models in markets with differentiated goods by analyzing the homogeneous goods limit of these lusion This analysis reveals that the impact of parameter changes on the incentives to deviate from models. a ..."
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develop and illustrate a methodology for obtaining robust comparative statics results for colWe models in markets with differentiated goods by analyzing the homogeneous goods limit of these lusion This analysis reveals that the impact of parameter changes on the incentives to deviate from models
Aggregate Comparative Statics
 CEPR DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 7254
, 2011
"... In aggregative games, each player’s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics ca ..."
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Cited by 14 (5 self)
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can be cast as aggregative games. In most of these situations, the behavior of the aggregate is of interest both directly and also indirectly because the comparative statics of the actions of each player can be obtained as a function of the aggregate. In this paper, we provide a general and tractable
Distributional Comparative Statics
, 2012
"... An important set of questions in economics concern how changes in the distribution of economic parameters (income, wealth, productivity, distortions, information, etc.) impact individual choices and market outcomes. We currently do not have tools to answer such questions. In this paper, I develop a ..."
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theory of distributional comparative statics that addresses this set of issues. Central to the developments is a new concept called strategic riskaversion which determines the outcome of most distributional comparative statics exercises. As illustrations I analyze the relationship between savings
Ratio Orderings and Comparative Statics
, 2003
"... Monotone ratio orderings are refinements of first order stochastic dominance that allow monotone comparative statics results in games of incomplete information. We develop analogous refinements for second order stochastic dominance based on the monotonicity of the cumulative probability ratio and th ..."
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Monotone ratio orderings are refinements of first order stochastic dominance that allow monotone comparative statics results in games of incomplete information. We develop analogous refinements for second order stochastic dominance based on the monotonicity of the cumulative probability ratio
Comparative Statics, Stability, and Uniqueness
, 2015
"... Consider an economic model whose equilibrium can be represented as the xed point of a system of di¤erentiable equations. Using the theory ofBmatrices, I show that comparative statics are wellbehaved if the interactions between the equations are not too large, and the negative interactions are not t ..."
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Consider an economic model whose equilibrium can be represented as the xed point of a system of di¤erentiable equations. Using the theory ofBmatrices, I show that comparative statics are wellbehaved if the interactions between the equations are not too large, and the negative interactions
Existence, Comparative Statics, and Stability in
"... This paper proves that pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) exist in aggregative games with strategic substitutes for arbitrary strategy sets. The paper then turns to address, the structure of the equilibrium set, comparative statics, uniqueness, global stability, and existence of symmetric PSNE. ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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This paper proves that pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) exist in aggregative games with strategic substitutes for arbitrary strategy sets. The paper then turns to address, the structure of the equilibrium set, comparative statics, uniqueness, global stability, and existence of symmetric PSNE
Comparative Statics of Altruism and Spite
, 2012
"... The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other players ’ payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on everyone’s actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. As ..."
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involved are unstable. If they are stable, the social payoff can only increase or remain unchanged with an increasing degree of altruism. In these results, ‘stability ’ stands for a general notion of static stability, which includes a number of established ones, such as evolutionarily stable strategy
Comparative Statics of Altruism and Spite
, 2012
"... The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other players ’ payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on everyone’s actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. As ..."
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involved are unstable. If they are stable, the social payoff can only increase or remain unchanged with an increasing degree of altruism. In these results, ‘stability ’ stands for a general notion of static stability, which includes a number of established ones, such as evolutionarily stable strategy
Comparative Statics of Altruism and Spite
, 2006
"... The equilibrium outcome of a symmetric interaction between two people may depend on the weight they place on each other’s payoff. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. Paradoxically, the real, material payoff in a symmetric equilibrium ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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The equilibrium outcome of a symmetric interaction between two people may depend on the weight they place on each other’s payoff. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. Paradoxically, the real, material payoff in a symmetric equilibrium for a pair of altruists may be lower than for selfish or spiteful individuals. However, this can only be so if the equilibrium strategies are unstable. If they are stable, the payoff can only increase with decreasing selfishness or remain unchanged. JEL Classification: C62, C72, D64.
Results 1  10
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864,204