I show that when goods are perfectly divisible, the fundamental and speculative equilibria of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) can coexist. This val-idates welfare comparisons. The speculative equilibrium is always a better lubricated economy with a higher quantity of commodity money circulating. When

We study the role played by coin experts, called moneychangers, in the metallic money system. To do that, we introduce intermediaries that can expertise and certify coins into the Velde Weber and Wright’s (1999) model of commodity money with imperfectly recognizable coins. We show under which

A prominent feature of the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model of commodity money is the multiplicity of dynamic equilibria. We show that the frequency of search is strongly related to the extent of multiplicity. To isolate the role of frequency of search in generating multiplicity, we (i) vary

good (gold) as a commodity money between the time it is produced and the time it is removed by manufacture to yield utilitarian services. We compare the monetary value of the two money systems themselves, by introducing a natural money-metric social welfare function. Because labor allocation both

We study the role played by coin experts{moneychangers{in the metallic money system and their in°uence on the informational version of Gresham's law. We build a model with light and heavy silver coins, bilateral bargaining, imperfect recognizability of coins and add the possibility for agents

A prominent feature of the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model of commodity money is the multiplicity of dynamic equilibria. We show that the frequency of search is strongly related to the extent of multiplicity. To isolate the role of frequency of search in generating multiplicity, we (i) vary

We develop a model of commodity money with uncertainty concerning the quality of coins and study the role played by a coin inspection and certi…cation technology in improving monetary circulation and welfare. We show that this technology reduces the extent of circulation by weight (or Gresham’s law

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Abstract not found

1 We apply a commodity-money refinement to matching models in which people meet in pairs and buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to sellers. The refinement is applied by attaching a utility value to nominal money and letting that value approach zero. An equilibrium satisfies the refinement