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399
Bidding and Allocation in Combinatorial Auctions
 IN ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
, 2000
"... When an auction of multiple items is performed, it is often desirable to allow bids on combinations of items, as opposed to only on single items. Such an auction is often called "combinatorial", and the exponential number of possible combinations results in computational intractability o ..."
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Cited by 275 (11 self)
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When an auction of multiple items is performed, it is often desirable to allow bids on combinations of items, as opposed to only on single items. Such an auction is often called "combinatorial", and the exponential number of possible combinations results in computational intractability
Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions
, 1998
"... There is interest in designing simultaneous auctions for situations in which the value of assets to a bidder depends upon which other assets he or she wins. In such cases, bidders may well wish to submit bids for combinations of assets. When this is allowed, the problem of determining the revenue ma ..."
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Cited by 345 (1 self)
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maximizing set of nonconflicting bids can be a difficult one. We analyze this problem, identifying several different structures of combinatorial bids for which computational tractability is constructively demonstrated and some structures for which computational tractability 1 Introduction Some auctions
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
 In Proc. 17th Intl. Joint Conference on Artif. Intell
, 2001
"... Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand complementarity. Most algorithms are designed to work with explicit bids for concrete bundles of goods. However, logical bi ..."
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Cited by 98 (1 self)
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Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand complementarity. Most algorithms are designed to work with explicit bids for concrete bundles of goods. However, logical
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches
, 1999
"... In combinatorial auctions, multiple goods are sold simultaneously and bidders may bid for arbitrary combinations of goods. Determining the outcome of such an auction is an optimization problem that is NPcomplete in the general case. We propose two methods of overcoming this apparent intractability. ..."
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Cited by 288 (9 self)
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In combinatorial auctions, multiple goods are sold simultaneously and bidders may bid for arbitrary combinations of goods. Determining the outcome of such an auction is an optimization problem that is NPcomplete in the general case. We propose two methods of overcoming this apparent intractability
Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
 Journal of Political Economy
, 2000
"... I review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the ‘‘simultaneous ascending auction,’ ’ which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses in the United States. I analyze some capabilities and limitations of the auction, the roles of various de ..."
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Cited by 271 (21 self)
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detailed rules, the possibilities for introducing combinatorial bidding, and some considerations in adapting the auction for sales in which revenue, rather than efficiency, is the primary goal. I.
Combinatorial auctions: A survey
, 2000
"... Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes and furniture. Because of complementarities (or substitution effects) between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets or bundles of items ..."
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Cited by 215 (1 self)
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of items. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or combinations of different assets. This paper surveys the state of knowledge about the design of combinatorial auctions. Second, it uses this subject as a vehicle to convey the aspects of integer
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
, 2000
"... Combinatorial auctions, which allow agents to bid directly for bundles of resources, are necessary for optimal auctionbased solutions to resource allocation problems with agents that have nonadditive values for resources, such as distributed scheduling and task assignment problems. We introduc ..."
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Cited by 191 (25 self)
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Combinatorial auctions, which allow agents to bid directly for bundles of resources, are necessary for optimal auctionbased solutions to resource allocation problems with agents that have nonadditive values for resources, such as distributed scheduling and task assignment problems. We
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
 In ACM Electronic Commerce
, 2000
"... General combinatorial auctions—auctions in which bidders place unrestricted bids for bundles of goods—are the subject of increasing study. Much of this work has focused on algorithms for finding an optimal or approximately optimal set of winning bids. Comparatively little attention has been paid to ..."
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Cited by 162 (11 self)
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General combinatorial auctions—auctions in which bidders place unrestricted bids for bundles of goods—are the subject of increasing study. Much of this work has focused on algorithms for finding an optimal or approximately optimal set of winning bids. Comparatively little attention has been paid
Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions
"... • Bidding languages are languages for representing valuations over bundles of goods. They are called bidding languages, because they are used to formulate bids in combinatorial auctions. • Bidding languages are a particular class of languages for modelling preference in combinatorial auctions. Their ..."
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• Bidding languages are languages for representing valuations over bundles of goods. They are called bidding languages, because they are used to formulate bids in combinatorial auctions. • Bidding languages are a particular class of languages for modelling preference in combinatorial auctions
Matrix Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions
"... In a combinational auction in which bidders can bid on any combination of goods, bid data can be of exponential size. We describe an innovative new combinatorial auction format in which bidders submit “matrix bids”. The advantage of this approach is that it provides bidders a mechanism to compactly ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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In a combinational auction in which bidders can bid on any combination of goods, bid data can be of exponential size. We describe an innovative new combinatorial auction format in which bidders submit “matrix bids”. The advantage of this approach is that it provides bidders a mechanism to compactly
Results 1  10
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399