The perception of bodily sensations during emotion: A cross-cultural perspective

of thinking of something that could be called the representational content of experience have little to do with phenomenology or with the kind of properties that the representationist takes the phenomenology to constitutively represent. Thus the representationist thesis involves a partially stipulated notion of representational content. This is not, in itself, a criticism, but as I shall argue, there is a problem about how the stipulation should go in the case of pain. Thus in my view, the dispute between Tye and Colin McGinn over whether pain even has representational content is not a dispute about a matter of fact, but a dispute about how to talk. The same applies to Tye's claim that a referred pain (e.g. a pain in the inside of the left arm caused by malfunction in the heart or a pain in the groin caused by malfunction in the kidney) is non-veridical. Pretheoretically, we might (might!) regard such a pain as misleading but not false or inaccurate or non-veridical. We are willing to

When consumers shop, the flooring underfoot can prompt bodily sensations—a sense of comfort from soft carpeting or fatigue from hard tile flooring. Like moods, such bodily sensations may foster context effects on the products shoppers observe. However, whereas moods prompt only assimilation effects

Two experiments examined expectations and bodily sensations in pre-menstrual symptom reports. Women took a fictitious test that indicated they were either "premenstrual " or "intermenstrual. " In Experiment 1, 48 women were studied during their premenstrual phase. In Experiment

Patients troubled by symptoms, regardless of the degree of demonstrable disease, are subject to forces that cause them to amplify, focus upon, and worry about these bodily perceptions. These forces are psychological, sociocultural, or part of the medical care process. Optimal management

Representationism, 1 as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. (I say ‘seem ’ because in my view, representationists cannot actually handle either type of experience successfully, but I will put that claim to one side here.) I will argue that Michael Tye’s heroic attempt (this volume) at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the root of this difference. Representationism is in part an attempt to make an account of phenomenal character comport with G. E. Moore’s diaphanousness intuition, the idea of which is that when I try to introspect my experience of the red tomato, I only succeed in attending to the color of the tomato itself, and not to any mental feature of the experience. The representationist thinks we can exploit this intuition to explain phenomenal character in nonphenomenal terms. To understand representationism, we need to know what to make of the phrase ‘representational content ’ as applied to an experience. There is no clear pretheoretical notion of representational content as applied to an experience, certainly none that will be of use to the representationist. True, I can speak of seeing that and seeing as, and more generally of experiencing that and experiencing as. Looking at the gas gauge, I can say that I see that the tank is empty (Dretske 1995). And I can say that I experience my wound as a medical emergency. These (and other) pretheoretical ways of thinking of something that could be called the representational content of experience have little to do with phenomenology or with the kind of properties that the representationist takes the phenomenology to constitutively represent. Thus the representationist thesis involves a partially stipulated notion of representational content. This is not, in itself, a criticism, but as I shall argue, there is a problem about how the stipulation should go in the case of pain. 138

females) were recruited from the greater Burlington, Vermont community. Results indicated that pre-challenge AS, but not perceived control over anxiety-related events, significantly predicted post-challenge panic attack symptoms, anxiety focused on bodily sensations, and interest in returning for another

Abstract not found

and fear of bodily sensations in panic disorder and social phobia

To accurately interpret tactile information, the brain needs to have an accurate representation of the body to which to refer the sensations. Despite this, body representation has only recently been incorporated into the study of tactile perception. Here, we investigate whether distortions of body