Results 1  10
of
32
Bayesian Persuasion
, 2009
"... When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structur ..."
Abstract

Cited by 36 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information
On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders∗
, 2014
"... In a multisender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) senders reveal information simultaneously, (ii) senders ’ information can be arbitrarily correlated, and (iii) sen ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
In a multisender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) senders reveal information simultaneously, (ii) senders ’ information can be arbitrarily correlated, and (iii
Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
, 2015
"... We consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem, as formalized by Kamenica and Gentzkow [27], from an algorithmic perspective in the presence of high dimensional and combinatorial uncertainty. Specifically, one player (the receiver) must take one of a number of actions with apriori unknown payoff; ano ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
We consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem, as formalized by Kamenica and Gentzkow [27], from an algorithmic perspective in the presence of high dimensional and combinatorial uncertainty. Specifically, one player (the receiver) must take one of a number of actions with apriori unknown payoff
Bayesian Persuasion with Heterogeneous Priors
, 2015
"... In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment (public signal). We characterize the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by an experiment, and pr ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
, and provide necessary and sucient conditions for a sender to benefit from persuasion. We then provide sucient conditions for the sender to benefit from persuasion for almost every pair of prior beliefs, even when there is no value of persuasion under a common prior. Our main condition is that the receiver’s
Bayesian Persuasion Web Appendix
, 2010
"... In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal pi whose realization is observed by Receiver who then takes her action. In Subsection 2.3 we made an observation that Sender’s gain from persuasion is weakly greater in this game than in any other communication game. In this sect ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal pi whose realization is observed by Receiver who then takes her action. In Subsection 2.3 we made an observation that Sender’s gain from persuasion is weakly greater in this game than in any other communication game
Bayesian Persuasion Online Appendix
, 2010
"... In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal π whose realization is observed by Receiver who then takes her action. In Subsection 2.3 we made two important observations about this game. The first observation is that, as long as Receiver knows which π Sender chose, it is not ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
gain from persuasion is weakly greater in the game that we study than in any other communication game, including Spence (1973), Crawford and Sobel (1982), or Milgrom (1981). In this section of the Online Appendix we provide a formal statement and proof of these two claims. To do so, we introduce
Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps∗
, 2014
"... This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional in ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional
Persuasion as a Contest By
, 2008
"... ABSTRACT:We examine how the probability of persuading an audience depends on resources expended by contending parties. We use a Bayesian approach whereby the audience makes inferences solely based on the evidence produced by the contestants. We …nd conditions that yield the wellknown additive conte ..."
Abstract

Cited by 3 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
ABSTRACT:We examine how the probability of persuading an audience depends on resources expended by contending parties. We use a Bayesian approach whereby the audience makes inferences solely based on the evidence produced by the contestants. We …nd conditions that yield the wellknown additive
ADAPTIVE PERSUASIVE MESSAGES IN AN ECOMMERCE SETTING: THE USE OF PERSUASION PROFILES
"... Technologies that are intentionally designed to change a person’s attitude or behaviors are emergent. Designers of these technologies frequently use implementations of influence strategies to increase the effectiveness of their systems. In this paper we argue that there are large individual differen ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
influence strategies. To evaluate the notion of persuasion profiles we build an adaptive persuasive system in an ecommerce setting and test this system against a nonadaptive counterpart. We describe how — using Bayesian learning — designers can implement adaptive persuasive technologies. To our knowledge
Results 1  10
of
32