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Results 1 - 10
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666
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
- Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 563 (1 self)
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This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement
Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
, 1997
"... We review studies conducted by ourselves and coauthors that document a "self-serving " bias in judgments of fairness and demonstrate that the bias is an important cause of impasse in negotiations. We discuss experimental evidence showing that (a) the bias causes impasse; (b) it is possible ..."
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Cited by 349 (9 self)
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) it is possible to reduce impasses by debiasing bargainers; and (c) the bias results from selective evaluation of information. We also review results from a field study of negotiations between teachers ' unions and school boards in Pennsylvania that both documents the fairness bias in a naturalistic setting
BARGAINING
"... Bargaining is ubiquitous. Married couples are almost constantly negotiating over a variety of matters such as who will do which domestic chores and who will take the kids to the local park on a wet Sunday afternoon. Government policy is typically the outcome of negotiations amongst cabinet ministers ..."
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Bargaining is ubiquitous. Married couples are almost constantly negotiating over a variety of matters such as who will do which domestic chores and who will take the kids to the local park on a wet Sunday afternoon. Government policy is typically the outcome of negotiations amongst cabinet
Bargaining
"... Complexity of communication is one of the important factors that distinguishes multilateral negotiation from its bilateral cousin. We investigate how the communication configuration affects a three-person coalition negotiation. Restricting who can communicate with whom strongly influences outcomes, ..."
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, and not always in ways that current theory anticipates. Competitive frictions, including a tendency to communicate offers privately, appear to shape much of what we observe. Our results suggest that parties with weaker alternatives would benefit from a more constrained structure, especially if they can
THE GENDER AGENDA: Bargaining with Political Parties
, 2008
"... This document represents part of the author’s study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute. Research papers are not made available for circulation outside of the Institute. ..."
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This document represents part of the author’s study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute. Research papers are not made available for circulation outside of the Institute.
2005): “Endogenous competitive bargaining
"... We analyze a bargaining game where two agents compete for the right to propose a split of the pie to the other. This captures the notion that agenda control is a valuable asset that both bargaining parties covet. In the game, time is finite and agents are endowed with bidding capital. Each period, t ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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We analyze a bargaining game where two agents compete for the right to propose a split of the pie to the other. This captures the notion that agenda control is a valuable asset that both bargaining parties covet. In the game, time is finite and agents are endowed with bidding capital. Each period
Effective parties in a model of repeated legislative bargaining
- Presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meetings
, 2000
"... A self-enforcing, equilibrium account of legislative party organization in the context of the standard legislative bargaining model demonstrates how a members of a party could overcome the temptations to violate a party’s agreement to stick together on legislative matters in the absence of external ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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A self-enforcing, equilibrium account of legislative party organization in the context of the standard legislative bargaining model demonstrates how a members of a party could overcome the temptations to violate a party’s agreement to stick together on legislative matters in the absence of external
Fairness in bargaining
, 2003
"... We consider new three player games to test existing models of fairness. Our games consist of a proposer who offers an allocation of $10 between two players, either himself and the responder or the responder and a third party. In each case, the responder either accepts or rejects this allocation. In ..."
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We consider new three player games to test existing models of fairness. Our games consist of a proposer who offers an allocation of $10 between two players, either himself and the responder or the responder and a third party. In each case, the responder either accepts or rejects this allocation
Wage Bargaining and Nominal Rigidities
- European Economic Review
, 1994
"... Delays in wage negotiations do not necessarily mean work stoppage. Production can continue under the terms of the old contract while the parties are bargaining (holdout). This holdout option is included in a strategic bargaining game in addition to strike and lock-out threats. Integrating the bargai ..."
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Cited by 43 (17 self)
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Delays in wage negotiations do not necessarily mean work stoppage. Production can continue under the terms of the old contract while the parties are bargaining (holdout). This holdout option is included in a strategic bargaining game in addition to strike and lock-out threats. Integrating
Bargaining in n-party legislatures over government formation
"... This paper questions results that claim to extend non-cooperative models of bargaining in legislatures from the highly atypical three-party case to a generic n-party setting. It identifies problems both with the derivation of theoretical results and the empirical evaluation of these. No empirically ..."
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This paper questions results that claim to extend non-cooperative models of bargaining in legislatures from the highly atypical three-party case to a generic n-party setting. It identifies problems both with the derivation of theoretical results and the empirical evaluation of these. No empirically
Results 1 - 10
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666
