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Table 10: Beller-Yacobi Authenticated Key Transport Protocol
1998
"... In PAGE 36: ...3.2.2 Comparison with Beller-Yacobi Protocol The next protocol we examine is an efficient proposal by Beller and Yacobi [6]. Their proto- col is briefly summarized in Table10 , using notations consistent with those for signcryption schemes. As is the case for our proposals based on signcryption, here it is assumed too that public key certificates have already been transferred prior to an execution of the protocol.... ..."
Table 10: Beller-Yacobi Authenticated Key Transport Protocol
1998
"... In PAGE 36: ...3.2.2 Comparison with Beller-Yacobi Protocol The next protocol we examine is an e#0Ecient proposal by Beller and Yacobi #5B6#5D. Their proto- col is brie#0Dy summarized in Table10 , using notations consistent with those for signcryption schemes. As is the case for our proposals based on signcryption, here it is assumed too that public key certi#0Ccates have already been transferred prior to an execution of the protocol.... ..."
Table 10: Beller-Yacobi Authenticated Key Transport Protocol
"... In PAGE 36: ...3.2.2 Comparison with Beller-Yacobi Protocol The next protocol we examine is an e cient proposal by Beller and Yacobi [6]. Their proto- col is brie y summarized in Table10 , using notations consistent with those for signcryption schemes. As is the case for our proposals based on signcryption, here it is assumed too that public key certi cates have already been transferred prior to an execution of the protocol.... ..."
Table 9: Beller-Yacobi Authenticated Key Transport Protocol
"... In PAGE 20: ....1.2 Comparison with Beller-Yacobi Protocol The next protocol we examine is an e cient proposal by Beller and Yacobi [3]. Their proto- col is brie y summarized in Table9 , using notations consistent with those for signcryption schemes. As is the case for our proposals based on signcryption, here it is assumed too that public key certi cates have already been transferred prior to an execution of the protocol.... ..."
Table 9: Beller-Yacobi Authenticated Key Transport Protocol
"... In PAGE 19: ....1.2 Comparison with Beller-Yacobi Protocol The next protocol we examine is an e cient proposal by Beller and Yacobi [3]. Their proto- col is brie y summarized in Table9 , using notations consistent with those for signcryption schemes. As is the case for our proposals based on signcryption, here it is assumed too that public key certi cates have already been transferred prior to an execution of the protocol.... ..."
Table 1. Proposed two-party authenticated key agreement protocol.
"... In PAGE 5: ... Then, advantageE(k) = Pr[GoodGuessE(k)] 1 2 is negligible3. In the following we will show that the protocol described in Table1 is a secure OPAK protocol. 2 Intuitively, two oracles are said to have matching conversations if one of them is the initiator of an exchange of messages, and the messages sent by each of the two are identical to those received by the other, and are in the same temporal order.... In PAGE 6: ... Theorem 1. The protocol shown in Table1 is a secure OPAK protocol, provided that the CDH problem is computationally hard and H1, H2 are independent random oracles. Proof: See Appendix.... ..."
Table 3: Recommended key authenticity received by BT
1999
Cited by 9
Table 3: Recommended key authenticity received by A
Table 3.1: Parameters for A-codes with a totally secret authentication key
Table 12.3 Simulated performance comparison of round e cient authenticated key distribution protocols (values in milliseconds)
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