• Documents
  • Authors
  • Tables
  • Log in
  • Sign up
  • MetaCart
  • DMCA
  • Donate

CiteSeerX logo

Advanced Search Include Citations

Tools

Sorted by:
Try your query at:
Semantic Scholar Scholar Academic
Google Bing DBLP
Results 1 - 10 of 151,549
Next 10 →

Algorithmic mechanism design

by Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen - Games and Economic Behavior , 1999
"... We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agen ..."
Abstract - Cited by 662 (23 self) - Add to MetaCart
that the agents ’ interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative task scheduling problem for which the standard mechanism design tools

Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design

by Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier , 2010
"... The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive compatib ..."
Abstract - Cited by 41 (11 self) - Add to MetaCart
The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design

by Rahul Sami , 2003
"... Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is an approach to designing distributed systems that takes into account both the distributed-computational environment and the incentives of autonomous agents. In this dissertation, we study two problems, multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 11 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is an approach to designing distributed systems that takes into account both the distributed-computational environment and the incentives of autonomous agents. In this dissertation, we study two problems, multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions

by Joan Feigenbaum, Scott Shenker , 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
Abstract - Cited by 283 (24 self) - Add to MetaCart
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation

Algorithmic Mechanism Design contact:

by Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen Y, Amir Ronen
"... We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agen ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
that the agents ' interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the eld of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. In this model the algorithmic solution is adorned with payments to the participants and is termed a mechanism. The payments should

Challenges in algorithmic mechanism design

by Paul David Dütting , 2013
"... ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Abstract not found

On the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design

by Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi
"... In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there is evidence that no polynomial-time truthful deterministic m ..."
Abstract - Cited by 32 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart
In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there is evidence that no polynomial-time truthful deterministic

Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

by Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden
"... We give the first black-box reduction from arbitrary approximation algorithms to truthful approximation mechanisms for a non-trivial class of multiparameter problems. Specifically, we prove that every packing problem that admits an FPTAS also admits a truthful-in-expectation randomized mechanism th ..."
Abstract - Cited by 25 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
that is an FPTAS. Our reduction makes novel use of smoothed analysis, by employing small perturbations as a tool in algorithmic mechanism design. We develop a “duality” between linear perturbations of the objective function of an optimization problem and of its feasible set, and use the “primal” and “dual

Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design [Extended Abstract]

by Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier
"... The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive compatib ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive

Algorithmic mechanism design for load balancing in distributed systems

by Daniel Grosu, Anthony T. Chronopoulos - IEEE TRANS. SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS , 2004
"... Computational grids are promising next-generation computing platforms for large-scale problems in science and engineering. Grids are large-scale computing systems composed of geographically distributed resources (computers, storage etc.) owned by self interested agents or organizations. These agent ..."
Abstract - Cited by 43 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
of problems is the object of mechanism design theory. Using this theory, we design a truthful mechanism for solving the static load balancing problem in heterogeneous distributed systems. We prove that using the optimal allocation algorithm the output function admits a truthful payment scheme satisfying
Next 10 →
Results 1 - 10 of 151,549
Powered by: Apache Solr
  • About CiteSeerX
  • Submit and Index Documents
  • Privacy Policy
  • Help
  • Data
  • Source
  • Contact Us

Developed at and hosted by The College of Information Sciences and Technology

© 2007-2019 The Pennsylvania State University