that the agents ’ interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative task scheduling problem for which the standard mechanism design tools

The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive

Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is an approach to designing distributed systems that takes into account both the distributed-computational environment and the incentives of autonomous agents. In this dissertation, we study two problems, multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation

that the agents ' interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the eld of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. In this model the algorithmic solution is adorned with payments to the participants and is termed a mechanism. The payments should

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In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there is evidence that no polynomial-time truthful deterministic

that is an FPTAS. Our reduction makes novel use of smoothed analysis, by employing small perturbations as a tool in algorithmic mechanism design. We develop a “duality” between linear perturbations of the objective function of an optimization problem and of its feasible set, and use the “primal” and “dual

The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive

of problems is the object of mechanism design theory. Using this theory, we design a truthful mechanism for solving the static load balancing problem in heterogeneous distributed systems. We prove that using the optimal allocation algorithm the output function admits a truthful payment scheme satisfying