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Algorithmic mechanism design
 Games and Economic Behavior
, 1999
"... We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own selfinterest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agen ..."
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Cited by 662 (23 self)
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that the agents ’ interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative task scheduling problem for which the standard mechanism design tools
Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
, 2010
"... The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive compatib ..."
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Cited by 41 (11 self)
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The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design
, 2003
"... Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is an approach to designing distributed systems that takes into account both the distributedcomputational environment and the incentives of autonomous agents. In this dissertation, we study two problems, multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. ..."
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Cited by 11 (2 self)
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Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is an approach to designing distributed systems that takes into account both the distributedcomputational environment and the incentives of autonomous agents. In this dissertation, we study two problems, multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions
, 2002
"... Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autono ..."
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Cited by 283 (24 self)
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Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation
Algorithmic Mechanism Design contact:
"... We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own selfinterest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agen ..."
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that the agents ' interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the eld of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. In this model the algorithmic solution is adorned with payments to the participants and is termed a mechanism. The payments should
On the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design
"... In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multiunit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there is evidence that no polynomialtime truthful deterministic m ..."
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Cited by 32 (8 self)
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In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multiunit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there is evidence that no polynomialtime truthful deterministic
BlackBox Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
"... We give the first blackbox reduction from arbitrary approximation algorithms to truthful approximation mechanisms for a nontrivial class of multiparameter problems. Specifically, we prove that every packing problem that admits an FPTAS also admits a truthfulinexpectation randomized mechanism th ..."
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Cited by 25 (5 self)
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that is an FPTAS. Our reduction makes novel use of smoothed analysis, by employing small perturbations as a tool in algorithmic mechanism design. We develop a “duality” between linear perturbations of the objective function of an optimization problem and of its feasible set, and use the “primal” and “dual
Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design [Extended Abstract]
"... The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive compatib ..."
Abstract
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The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive
Algorithmic mechanism design for load balancing in distributed systems
 IEEE TRANS. SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS
, 2004
"... Computational grids are promising nextgeneration computing platforms for largescale problems in science and engineering. Grids are largescale computing systems composed of geographically distributed resources (computers, storage etc.) owned by self interested agents or organizations. These agent ..."
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Cited by 43 (5 self)
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of problems is the object of mechanism design theory. Using this theory, we design a truthful mechanism for solving the static load balancing problem in heterogeneous distributed systems. We prove that using the optimal allocation algorithm the output function admits a truthful payment scheme satisfying
Results 1  10
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1,901,179