Results 1 - 10 of 430

On Transparency in Organizations

by unknown authors , 2011
"... Should workers be informed of the incentive schemes governing their team co-workers? Should workers be told on which performance measure they will be as-sessed? Should workers be told how important the tasks are for the organization? This paper shows in an abstract moral hazard setup why in rich eno ..."
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Should workers be informed of the incentive schemes governing their team co-workers? Should workers be told on which performance measure they will be as-sessed? Should workers be told how important the tasks are for the organization? This paper shows in an abstract moral hazard setup why in rich

On Transparency in Organizations

by unknown authors , 2011
"... Should workers be informed of the incentive schemes governing their team co-workers? Should workers be told on which performance measure they will be as-sessed? Should workers be told detailed statistics about workersattitudes in the past? This paper shows in an abstract moral hazard setup why in ri ..."
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Should workers be informed of the incentive schemes governing their team co-workers? Should workers be told on which performance measure they will be as-sessed? Should workers be told detailed statistics about workersattitudes in the past? This paper shows in an abstract moral hazard setup why

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences,”

by Hideshi Itoh , Shinsuke Kambe , Michihiro Kandori , Hi-Toshi Matsushima , Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara , Pedro Rey Biel , Takashi Shimizu , Katsuya Takii - Japanese Economic Review, , 2004
"... Abstract The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights into organizational behavior by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding (social or interdependent) preferences, in particular, inequity aversion theory. In the benchmar ..."
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Abstract The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights into organizational behavior by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding (social or interdependent) preferences, in particular, inequity aversion theory

Moral hazard with soft information

by Guillaume Roger , 2010
"... Abstract I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the risk-averse agent takes an action and she alone observes the stochastic outcome; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. For a class of audit technologies, no revelation mechanism can be truthful and a dir ..."
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Abstract I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the risk-averse agent takes an action and she alone observes the stochastic outcome; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. For a class of audit technologies, no revelation mechanism can be truthful and a

Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals

by Andrew Clausen
"... Abstract In many moral hazard problems, the principal evaluates the agent's performance based on signals which the agent may suppress and replace with counterfeits. This form of fraud may aect the design of optimal contracts drastically. For example, if fraud is costless and produces perfect c ..."
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Abstract In many moral hazard problems, the principal evaluates the agent's performance based on signals which the agent may suppress and replace with counterfeits. This form of fraud may aect the design of optimal contracts drastically. For example, if fraud is costless and produces perfect

MORAL HAZARD AND THE OPTIMALITY OF DEBT

by Benjamin Hébert
"... ABSTRACT. Why are debt securities so common? I show that debt securities minimize the welfare losses associated with the moral hazards of excessive risk-taking and lax effort. For any security design, the variance of the security payoff is a statistic that summarizes these welfare losses. Debt secur ..."
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ABSTRACT. Why are debt securities so common? I show that debt securities minimize the welfare losses associated with the moral hazards of excessive risk-taking and lax effort. For any security design, the variance of the security payoff is a statistic that summarizes these welfare losses. Debt

Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals

by Kenneth Burdett, Andrew Postlewaite, Kenneth Burdett, Andrew Postlewaite, Kelly A. Quinn, Andrew Clausen, Steven Matthews, Grey Gordon , 2011
"... We are pleased to provide below the curriculum vitae and dissertation abstracts of the Penn Economics Ph.D. students who seek employment in this year's job market. Also find in the below table a summary indicating fields of interest and advisors ' names. Full dissertation abstracts and res ..."
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We are pleased to provide below the curriculum vitae and dissertation abstracts of the Penn Economics Ph.D. students who seek employment in this year's job market. Also find in the below table a summary indicating fields of interest and advisors ' names. Full dissertation abstracts

Selection on moral hazard in health insurances

by Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Stephen Ryan, Paul Schrimpf, Mark Cullen - American Economic Review , 2013
"... Preliminary and incomplete. Comments are very welcome. Abstract. Existing empirical work on asymmetric information in insurance markets tends to focus either on selection or on moral hazard, but not on how they interact. In this paper we explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance ..."
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Preliminary and incomplete. Comments are very welcome. Abstract. Existing empirical work on asymmetric information in insurance markets tends to focus either on selection or on moral hazard, but not on how they interact. In this paper we explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance

Moral Hazard and Reciprocity

by Marco Castillo (corresponding, Gregory Leo
"... Abstract: We investigate the motives behind reciprocal behavior by making selfish acts anonymous but not common knowledge. In one treatment, subjects were assigned to the role of proposer or responder and played a trust game with random matching for 20 rounds. In a second treatment, the modified gam ..."
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Abstract: We investigate the motives behind reciprocal behavior by making selfish acts anonymous but not common knowledge. In one treatment, subjects were assigned to the role of proposer or responder and played a trust game with random matching for 20 rounds. In a second treatment, the modified

Incentives and competition under moral hazard

by A. Attar, A. Chassagnon , 2006
"... The work introduces a simple framework to study the relationship between competition and incentives under non-exclusivity. We characterize the equilibria of an insurance market where intermediaries compete over the contracts they offer to a single consumer in the presence of moral hazard. Non-exclus ..."
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The work introduces a simple framework to study the relationship between competition and incentives under non-exclusivity. We characterize the equilibria of an insurance market where intermediaries compete over the contracts they offer to a single consumer in the presence of moral hazard. Non
Results 1 - 10 of 430