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Quantifying Information Flow

by Gavin Lowe - In Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop , 2002
"... We extend definitions of information flow so as to quantify the amount of information passed; in other words, we give a formal definition of the capacity of covert channels. Our definition uses the process algebra CSP, and is based upon counting the number of di#erent behaviours of a high level user ..."
Abstract - Cited by 100 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
We extend definitions of information flow so as to quantify the amount of information passed; in other words, we give a formal definition of the capacity of covert channels. Our definition uses the process algebra CSP, and is based upon counting the number of di#erent behaviours of a high level

Quantifying information flow with beliefs

by Michael R. Clarkson, Andrew C. Myers, Fred B. Schneider - Cornell University , 2006
"... To reason about information flow, a new model is developed that describes how attacker beliefs change due to the attacker’s observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model enables compositional reasoning about information flow from attacks involving sequences of ..."
Abstract - Cited by 31 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
To reason about information flow, a new model is developed that describes how attacker beliefs change due to the attacker’s observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model enables compositional reasoning about information flow from attacks involving sequences

Quantifying information flow for dynamic secrets

by Piotr Mardziel, Mário S. Alvim, Michael Hicks, Michael R. Clarkson
"... Abstract—A metric is proposed for quantifying leakage of information about secrets and about how secrets change over time. The metric is used with a model of information flow for probabilistic, interactive systems with adaptive adversaries. The model and metric are implemented in a probabilistic pro ..."
Abstract - Cited by 6 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—A metric is proposed for quantifying leakage of information about secrets and about how secrets change over time. The metric is used with a model of information flow for probabilistic, interactive systems with adaptive adversaries. The model and metric are implemented in a probabilistic

Quantifying Information Flow Using Min-Entropy

by Geoffrey Smith
"... Quantitative theories of information flow are of growing interest, due to the fundamental importance of protecting confidential information from improper disclosure, together with the unavoidability of “small” leaks in practical systems. But while it is tempting to measure leakage using classic inf ..."
Abstract - Cited by 11 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
Quantitative theories of information flow are of growing interest, due to the fundamental importance of protecting confidential information from improper disclosure, together with the unavoidability of “small” leaks in practical systems. But while it is tempting to measure leakage using classic

A static analysis for quantifying information flow in a simple imperative language

by David Clark, Sebastian Hunt, Pasquale Malacaria
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 67 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract not found

Adversary Gain vs. Defender Loss in Quantified Information Flow

by Piotr Mardziel, Mário S. Alvim, Michael Hicks
"... Abstract—Metrics for quantifying information leakage as-sume that an adversary’s gain is the defender’s loss. We demonstrate that this assumption does not always hold via a class of scenarios. We describe how to extend quantification to account for a defender with goals distinct from adversary failu ..."
Abstract - Cited by 2 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Metrics for quantifying information leakage as-sume that an adversary’s gain is the defender’s loss. We demonstrate that this assumption does not always hold via a class of scenarios. We describe how to extend quantification to account for a defender with goals distinct from adversary

Network information flow

by Rudolf Ahlswede, Ning Cai, Shuo-Yen Robert Li, Raymond W. Yeung - IEEE TRANS. INFORM. THEORY , 2000
"... We introduce a new class of problems called network information flow which is inspired by computer network applications. Consider a point-to-point communication network on which a number of information sources are to be mulitcast to certain sets of destinations. We assume that the information source ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1967 (24 self) - Add to MetaCart
We introduce a new class of problems called network information flow which is inspired by computer network applications. Consider a point-to-point communication network on which a number of information sources are to be mulitcast to certain sets of destinations. We assume that the information

Language-Based Information-Flow Security

by Andrei Sabelfeld , Andrew C. Myers - IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS , 2003
"... Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker throug ..."
Abstract - Cited by 827 (57 self) - Add to MetaCart
through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow.

Certification of Programs for Secure Information Flow

by Dorothy E. Denning, Peter J. Denning , 1977
"... This paper presents a certification mechanism for verifying the secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis phase of most existing c ..."
Abstract - Cited by 490 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper presents a certification mechanism for verifying the secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis phase of most existing

Jflow: Practical mostly-static information flow control.

by Andrew C Myers - In Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages, , 1999
"... Abstract A promising technique for protecting privacy and integrity of sensitive data is to statically check information flow within programs that manipulate the data. While previous work has proposed programming language extensions to allow this static checking, the resulting languages are too res ..."
Abstract - Cited by 584 (33 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract A promising technique for protecting privacy and integrity of sensitive data is to statically check information flow within programs that manipulate the data. While previous work has proposed programming language extensions to allow this static checking, the resulting languages are too
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