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2,292
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 563 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution
, 2004
"... I prove that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy ‘Disagreement Point Convexity ’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’. I explain how this improves previous results obtained by Chun (1990) and by Dagan et al. (2002). 1 ..."
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I prove that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy ‘Disagreement Point Convexity ’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’. I explain how this improves previous results obtained by Chun (1990) and by Dagan et al. (2002). 1
On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise
, 2002
"... Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size. Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus as in the Nash demand game with noise or remain silent and wait until the surplus was publicly observed. Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy Nash d ..."
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Cited by 5 (3 self)
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demand game results in two strict equilibria, in each of which one player takes almost the whole surplus, provided uncertainty is small. If commitments concern only who makes the first offer, the more balanced Nash bargaining solution is approximately restored. In all cases commitment occurs
Mediation and the Nash Bargaining Solution
, 2000
"... 1 I Thank Ariel Rubinstein for pointing me toward this problem and an anonymous referee for pointing out some ambiguities in an earlier version. Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University is gratefully acknowledged. This paper analyzes a model of bargaining in w ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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in which two parties use a mediator who sequentially makes random proposals until agreement by both parties is reached. I show that as the cost of delay shrinks to zero, the subgame perfect payoff converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with weights determined by the relative discount rates
On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution
, 1999
"... The present paper provides three different supporting results for the Nash bargaining solution of nperson bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a noncooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash so ..."
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The present paper provides three different supporting results for the Nash bargaining solution of nperson bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a noncooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash
A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution
 Social Choice and Welfare
"... We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of NonIndividually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a noncooperative bargaining interpretation to this l ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of NonIndividually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a noncooperative bargaining interpretation
PURE STRATEGY NASH BARGAINING SOLUTIONS
, 1975
"... A broad class of 2person threat games for which a unique pure strategy Nash bargaining solution exists is characterized in terms of three, simple, empirically meaningful restrictions on the joint objective function: compact domain, continuity, and "corner concavity." Connectedness [in par ..."
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A broad class of 2person threat games for which a unique pure strategy Nash bargaining solution exists is characterized in terms of three, simple, empirically meaningful restrictions on the joint objective function: compact domain, continuity, and "corner concavity." Connectedness [in
A SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
, 2010
"... This paper provides a decentralized dynamic foundation of the Nash bargaining solution, which selects an outcome that maximizes the product of the individual gains over the disagreement outcome. Two agents are drawn from a large population and randomly matched to a partnership, if they successfull ..."
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This paper provides a decentralized dynamic foundation of the Nash bargaining solution, which selects an outcome that maximizes the product of the individual gains over the disagreement outcome. Two agents are drawn from a large population and randomly matched to a partnership
2010), "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
 Econometrica
"... The coalitional Nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product of players ’ payoffs is maximal. We consider a noncooperative model with discounting in which one team may form and every player is randomly selected to make a proposal in every period. The grand tea ..."
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Cited by 9 (0 self)
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The coalitional Nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product of players ’ payoffs is maximal. We consider a noncooperative model with discounting in which one team may form and every player is randomly selected to make a proposal in every period. The grand
Coreequivalence for the Nash bargaining solution
, 2003
"... Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies. The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard twoperson bargaining games and their continuum counterparts as ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results reconfirm the Walrasian approach to Nash bargaining of Trockel (1996). Moreover we establish the same speed of convergence as is known from Debreu (1975) and Grodal (1975) for replicated pure exchange economies
Results 1  10
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2,292