market investors ’ interest rate expectations

return adds the historical average realized excess market returns to the current observed interest rate. While this model explicitly reflects the dependence of the market return on the interest rate, it fails to account for the effect of changes in the level of market risk. Three models of equilibrium

. Ross This paper uses an intertemporal general equilibrium asset pricing model to study the term structure of interest rates. In this model, anticipations, risk aversion, investment alternatives, and preferences about the timing of consumption all play a role in determining bond prices. Many

We present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns. The unpredictability of noise traders ’ beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational

for facing risk is a multiple of the variance of the risk. This means that risk compensation cannot vary independently of interest rate volatility. I also describe and empirically estimate a class of models that is broader than the standard a#ne class. These "essentially a#ne" models retain

The basic paradigm of asset pricing is in vibrant flux. The purely rational approach is being subsumed by a broader approach based upon the psychology of investors. In this approach, security expected returns are determined by both risk and misvaluation. This survey sketches a framework

The paper derives a general form of the term structure of interest rates. The following assumptions are made: (A.l) The instantaneous (spot) interest rate follows a diffusion process; (A.2) the price of a discount bond depends only on the spot rate over its term; and (A.3) the market is efficient

We study an incentive model of ®nancial intermediation in which ®rms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across ®rms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show

We estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for the postwar United States economy, before and after Volcker’s appointment as Fed Chairman in 1979. Our results point to substantial differences in the estimated rule across periods. In particular, interest rate policy

violate the marginal condition.2 Thus we expect a market solution to be suboptimal. However, a much more precise structure must be put on the problem if we are to understand the nature of the bias involved. It is useful to think of the question as one of quantity versus diversity. With scale economies