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Table 1. Summary of the Previous Attacks and of Our New Attacks

in Related-Key Impossible Differential Attacks on
by Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman, Nathan Keller 2006
"... In PAGE 12: ... 5 Summary and Conclusions In this paper we have presented several new related-key impossible differential attacks on 7-round and 8-round AES-192. The data and time complexities are summarized in Table1 . Our attacks significantly improve the attacks presented in [12], but use different properties of the key schedule of AES-192.... ..."
Cited by 2

Table 10. Comparing Detection Rates (in %) on Old and New Attacks

in unknown title
by unknown authors 1999
"... In PAGE 11: ...tion, we had hoped that the features we constructed would be general enough so that the models can detect new vari- ations of the known intrusions. Table10 compares the de- tection rates of old intrusions and new intrusions. Here new intrusions refer to those that did not have corresponding in- stances in the training data.... ..."
Cited by 169

Table 10. Comparing Detection Rates (in %) on Old and New Attacks

in A Data Mining Framework for Building Intrusion Detection Models ∗
by unknown authors
"... In PAGE 11: ...tion, we had hoped that the features we constructed would be general enough so that the models can detect new vari- ations of the known intrusions. Table10 compares the de- tection rates of old intrusions and new intrusions. Here new intrusions refer to those that did not have corresponding in- stances in the training data.... ..."

Table 15. Comparing Detection Rates (in %) on Old and New Attacks Category Old New

in A Framework for Constructing Features and Models for Intrusion Detection Systems
by Wenke Lee, Salvatore J. Stolfo, Name Salvatore, J. Stolfo 2000
"... In PAGE 20: ...Although our models were intended for misuse detection, we had hoped that the features we constructed would be general enough so that the models can detect new variations of the known intrusions. Table15 compares the detection rates of old intrusions and new intrusions. Here new intrusions refer to those that did not have corresponding instances in the training data.... ..."
Cited by 97

Table 1. Attack types used in the evaluation. New attacks that occurred only in the test data are bold.

in Evaluating intrusion detection systems: The 1998 darpa off-line intrusion detection evaluation
by David J. Fried, Isaac Graf, Joshua W. Haines, Kristopher R. Kendall, David Mcclung, Dan Weber, Seth E. Webster, Dan Wyschogrod, Robert K. Cunningham, Marc A. Zissman 2000
"... In PAGE 5: ...Attacks The 32 different attack types shown in Table1 were used in the evaluation. Attacks used during both training and testing are shown using normal type.... In PAGE 5: ... The attacks had a variety of goals. The upper row of Table1 contains denial of service (DoS) attacks designed to disrupt a host or network service.... In PAGE 5: ... The snmp-get R2L attack against the router is a password guessing attack where the community password of the router is guessed and an attacker then uses SNMP to monitor the router. The third row of Table1 contains user to root (U2R) attacks where a local user on a machine is able to obtain privileges normally reserved for the UNIX root or super user. Some U2R attacks exploit poorly written system programs that run at root level which are susceptible to buffer overflows (e.... In PAGE 5: ...uidperl (e.g. perl), and other software weaknesses. The bottom row of Table1 contains probe or scan attacks. These include many programs that can automatically scan a network of computers to gather information or find known vulnerabilities.... ..."
Cited by 83

Table 1. Attack types used in the evaluation. New attacks that occurred only in the test data are bold.

in Evaluating intrusion detection systems: The 1998 darpa off-line intrusion detection evaluation
by David J. Fried, Isaac Graf, Joshua W. Haines, Kristopher R. Kendall, David Mcclung, Dan Weber, Seth E. Webster, Dan Wyschogrod, Robert K. Cunningham, Marc A. Zissman 2000
"... In PAGE 5: ...Attacks The 32 different attack types shown in Table1 were used in the evaluation. Attacks used during both training and testing are shown using normal type.... In PAGE 5: ... The attacks had a variety of goals. The upper row of Table1 contains denial of service (DoS) attacks designed to disrupt a host or network service.... In PAGE 5: ... The snmp-get R2L attack against the router is a password guessing attack where the community password of the router is guessed and an attacker then uses SNMP to monitor the router. The third row of Table1 contains user to root (U2R) attacks where a local user on a machine is able to obtain privileges normally reserved for the UNIX root or super user. Some U2R attacks exploit poorly written system programs that run at root level which are susceptible to buffer overflows (e.... In PAGE 5: ...uidperl (e.g. perl), and other software weaknesses. The bottom row of Table1 contains probe or scan attacks. These include many programs that can automatically scan a network of computers to gather information or find known vulnerabilities.... ..."
Cited by 83

Table 4: Performance of table look up intrusion detection algorithm for old and new attacks.

in Using Program Behavior Profiles for Intrusion Detection
by Anup K. Ghosh, Aaron Schwartzbard, Michael Schatz 1999
"... In PAGE 5: ... The following tables show this breakdown. Table4 shows the performance of the algorithm for old and new attacks. An old attack is de ned as an attack identical or similar to an attack that was present in the training data.... ..."
Cited by 8

Table 2: New attacks detected by weighting schemes at 1% false alarm rate.

in Weighting versus pruning in rule validation for detecting network and host anomalies
by Gaurav Tandon
Cited by 1

Table 1. Summary of attacks on OA1 and OA2, two randomized side channel countermea- sures proposed by Oswald and Aigner. Note that our new attacks are the first to work even with a noisy side channel.

in unknown title
by unknown authors 2003
Cited by 6

Table 1. Summary of attacks on OA1 and OA2, two randomized side channel countermea- sures proposed by Oswald and Aigner. Note that our new attacks are the first to work even with a noisy side channel.

in Hidden Markov model cryptanalysis
by Chris Karlof, David Wagner 2003
Cited by 6
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