Stor may Japan and the International Monetary System by Nobumitsu Kagami, London* The 1970s saw the recurrence of major turmoil in the international monetary scene in which Japan played no small part. Japan's response to past monetary upheavals has always been passive and there were occasions when its

The international monetary system that was designed at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 reflected professional views on the defects of the arrangements that had prevailed in the 1930s. Protectionist trade policies, exchange controls, and competitive currency depreciations ’ of the pre-World War

This report presents a set of concrete proposals of increasing ambition for the reform of the international monetary system. The proposals aim at improving the international provision of liquidity in order to limit the effects of individual and systemic crises and decrease their frequency

Co-organized by the Korea Development Institute (KDI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),

in this paper is whether it is inevitable that the international monetary system avoids a framework of rules and obligations that are in principle enforceable. It will be taken as axiomatic that the dominant macroeconomic trends, the use of inflation targeting as the nominal anchor and floating exchange rates

, “International Liquidity and the Role of the SDR in the International Monetary System ” is to be published. This paper contains thoughts and insights from a lifetime of IMF work. We are particularly happy that the publication of this paper will coincide so closely with Mr. Polak’s 90th birthday on April 25, 2004

Politics has been defined as the constrained exercise of social power (Goodin and Klingemann 1996, p. 7). In turn, power can be described as the ability of A to get B to do what A wants, which B would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957); or, more precisely, as an inverse function of the cost to A of getting B to do what B would otherwise not do. Politics as I have defined it is absent from perfect markets. Indeed, the “perfect market, ” as an ideal point, is the absolute zero of politics— the point from which measurement starts. In a perfect market, no one has power, since no agent gains influence over any other agent. Real markets are imperfect. They involve some degree of bargaining. And they are embedded in political institutions. Political context matters—a major reason why so few generalizations about the “best ” policy to follow seem to be valid. Most of what we know analytically about bargaining comes from economics and decision science—especially from game theory—more

the effect that the ECB has and is likely to have on the functioning of the international monetary system.

Throughout his brilliant career, John Williamson has frequently focused his considerable analytical skills and powers of persuasion on reform of the international monetary system. This paper examines two principal areas of his concern: (1) exchange rates and the adjustment process, and (2

The global economic crisis of 2007 – 2009 generated calls to rethink the international monetary system, and indeed, the entire institutional frame-work within which international financial integration has advanced since the fall of the Bretton Woods regime four decades ago. Gaps in national