A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely

A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria are given. Known existence theorems are shown to be corollaries to the main theorem of this paper. Furthermore

Abstract. We study the performance of Fictitious Play, when used as a heuristic for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of a two-player game. We exhibit a class of two-player games having payoffs in the range [0, 1] that show that Fictitious Play fails to find a solution having an additive

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perfect and proper equilibria of n-player strategic games. This paper also shows, by example, that simulated annealing can be used to locate a perfect equilibrium in an extensive form game.

Assigned to-----------This is a working paper. It may be expanded, modified, or with-drawn at any time. The views, conclusions, and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the officio I views or policies of the United States Air Force.--------~--~R~nD~

We propose an algorithm called query by committee, in which a committee of students is trained on the same data set. The next query is chosen according to the principle of maximal disagreement. The algorithm is studied for two toy models: the high-low game and perceptron learning of another

(in principle) to use a model checker that can solve finite games for model checking of µC and second order propositional program logic 2M of C. Stirling [7]. For it paper [5] has defined a finite Hintika-like [2] game-theoretic semantics for a very expres-sive Second-Order Elementary Propo

This is a collection of ten invited articles on the computation of Nash equilibria in finite games. Three (by Ruchira Datta, Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald Peeters, and Tim Roughgarden) are longer surveys, the others present new research. All contributions attempt to make the material accessible

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