### Table 4. Cross-validated utility with various feature weight vectors. Fungi Dataset

"... In PAGE 5: ...1. Effect of Feature Weighting The results of various feature weight vectors, including those selected by WoLF PSORT are shown in Table4 . For those tables the value of k was optimized sep- arately for the taboo and no taboo list cases.... ..."

### Table 4: Cross-validated utility with various feature weight vectors. Utility is given as percent of the maximum possible. The number of (non-zero) weights is omitted when it is the same as the row above. Numerical entries represent averages over 5-fold cross-validation with standard deviations given in parenthesis. The psortEuclid weight vector has weight 1 for the quadratic term of each PSORT feature, allEuclid has weight 1 for the quadratic term of all features, allWeights has weight 1 for all possible terms, and WoLF PSORT is the weight vector selected by WoLF PSORT.

2006

"... In PAGE 5: ... 3 Results 3.1 Effect of Feature Weighting The results of various feature weight vectors, including those selected by WoLF PSORT are shown in Table4 . For those tables the value of k was optimized separately for the taboo and... ..."

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### Table 4: Loadings, Weights and Significance Level of Deployed Indicators

in ABSTRACT

"... In PAGE 5: ... The hypotheses underlying the model are explicated in the following sections. The respective indicators used to constitute the latent variables are given in Table4 in the appendix. 4.... In PAGE 11: ...Chin 1998b]). Construct reliability is tested using composite reliability (CR). The estimated indices were all above the threshold of 0.6 [Bagozzi and Yi 1988] as depicted in Table4 in the appendix. Discriminant validity of the utilized indicators can be analyzed by looking at the average variance extracted (AVE).... In PAGE 11: ... The calculated figures are all above the recommended threshold of 0.5 [Chin 1998b] (see Table4 in the appendix). Discriminant validity can also be assessed by checking the cross-loadings.... ..."

### Table 13: Threshold Game

1998

"... In PAGE 30: ... If 1 and 2 know this then they have to decide whether to rebid and byhowmuch. This yields a game that looks like Table13 where #28x,y#29 is #281 apos;s pro#0Ct, 2 apos;s pro#0Ct#29. There are 3 pure strategy Nash equilibria with raises of #280,3#2F4#29, #283#2F4,0#29, and #281#2F2, 1#2F2#29.... ..."

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### Table 1: The Games

"... In PAGE 3: ...The Games The experiment involves three related two{player stage games: Prisoner apos;s Dilemma (which we will sometimes abbreviate PD), Stag Hunt (SH), and Chicken (CH). These games are shown in Table1 . In each game, both players choose between two strategies: Cooperate (C) and Defect (D).... ..."

### Table 4. Framework of GAME

"... In PAGE 4: ... 2.7 Extension to unknown motif width The operations described above form the basic framework of our GAME program, as outlined in Table4 . We also have an extended version of our GAME program that allows the motif width to be unknown.... ..."

### Table 4. Framework of GAME

"... In PAGE 4: ... 2.7 Extension to unknown motif width The operations described above form the basic framework of our GAME program, as outlined in Table4 . We also have an extended version of our GAME program that allows the motif width to be unknown.... ..."

### Table 1: The Shapley Game.

"... In PAGE 2: ... We as- sume (as in many previous work) that payoffs are bounded, R(a; b) 2 [0; rmax], for real rmax. Table1 shows an ex- ample matrix game for two agents, the Shapley game, with rmax = 1. Each agent has 3 available actions.... ..."

### Table 2: Coordination Game

in multiagent

"... In PAGE 6: ... If the game is iterated or repeated, the mutual cooperation total payment must exceed the temptation total payment: 2 R gt; T + S. P2 cooperates P2 defects P1 cooperates R,R S,T P1 defects T,S P,P Table 1: PD Game The pure coordination game is symmetric, two player, two strategies, with payoff matrix as given in Table2 . In the coordination game the following holds: A gt;C and D gt;B.... ..."

### Table 3: Example Game

"... In PAGE 7: ... It has been be- lieved [10] that all three-player games are \strictly-determined quot; (forced win) or \symmetric non-strictly determined quot; (queer). However, are queer games always symmetric? For example, consider the game in Table3 where player A can choose between two queer positions: one where A would name B or C as win- ner, and one where B would name A or C as winner. Perhaps, A would prefer the second choice even though both are queer games, since he would then retain some chance of winning.... In PAGE 10: ... The other seven correspond to queer games. In Table3 , if player A chooses the winner between players B and C, then the only stable coalition would be BC. A together with any other player wins,... ..."

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