"... In PAGE 50: ... The result of cluster analysis shows that 4 models (model 1, 2, 3, amp; 4) take multiple core strategies, while model 5 takes single core strategy, product improvement. Table2 describes strategic behaviors of each model (cluster) in details. Each model... ..."

"... In PAGE 2: ... 2.3 Measurement model and constructs of Strategic Alignment Table1 shows the models of Strategic Alignment and its constructs that have been developed and used in previous research. ... ..."

"... In PAGE 9: ... The best solution is chosen to be the highest leftmost circle in the matrix. This is considered as the best strategic solution and it is a network of 14 plants listed with their production in Table1 and forming a network plotted in Figure 6. The net- work has the following features: .... ..."

"... In PAGE 4: ... Dynamic network constraints and benefits. These five issues are called relationship dimensions in Table1 . For each dimension, we collected from Gulati et al.... In PAGE 4: ... (2000) a typical set of a few concrete key factors characterising each dimension and being hopefully concrete enough to be applied in an empirical study. These factors, which are mentioned in Table1 , will be applied in our ex-post analysis of the case. After the analyses, we will reduce this theoretical list into a more compact checklist of important issues to be considered when developing a partnership-based ASP service integration.... In PAGE 5: ... First, the causes of failure were determined on the basis of interviews of representatives of both companies involved. Then, the sets of key factors presented in Table1 were considered and a new list of potential causes was developed. Comparing these two outcomes, conclusions were made regarding the important new issues proposed by the network model applied.... ..."

"... In PAGE 2: ... In particular, they showed that if agents incur a cost from computing then in English and Vickrey auctions strong strategic computing can occur in Nash equilibrium. Table2 shows whether strong strategic computation occurs in equilibrium for both mod- els of bounded rationality in the situation where the performance... ..."

"... In PAGE 11: ... Interestingly, the equilibrium behavior of the agents are different in the two models. Table1... ..."

"... In PAGE 4: ... In these twotypes of political settings | multiparty elections in Britain and presiden- tial primaries in the United States | many scholars have tried to estimate the amount of strategic behavior byvoters. As we report in Table1 , there is a great deal of variation in the estimates of strategic behavior reported in the literature, ranging from a low of 5.1#25 reported by Johnston and Pattie #281991#29 for the 1983 British elections to a high of 17#25 reported by Niemi et al.... In PAGE 4: ...iterature for the 1988 U.S. presidential primary are in the vicinity of 14#25. Table1 goes here In this paper we develop a new approach for modeling strategic voting: we incorporate the variance in the likelihood of strategic voting across constituencies in a model of voter choice. This builds upon recent empirical work on modeling voter choice in multiparty democratic systems #28Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 1995#29.... In PAGE 12: ...Empirical Evidence for Strategic Voting in the 1987 British Election In Table1 we present the full multinomial probit results from the estimation of this model. The results we obtain here are very similar to those presented in previous work on this same election, so we will refer interested readers to that research #28Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler 1997#29.... In PAGE 12: ... All we wish to note here is that most of the variables are signed in theoretically#7Bexpected manners, many are statistically signi#0Ccant, and this model correctly classi#0Ces 71#25 of the reported votes cast by the 2080 voters in our sample. #5B Table1 Goes Here#5D The important coe#0Ecients to focus on for our purposes are those on the three strategic voting variables. In the previous section we had argued that we expected each of these three coe#0Ecients to be negatively signed.... In PAGE 13: ... The #0Crst classi#0Ccation scheme is given by the rows of the table. To compute the rowentries we used the model reported in Table1 , but hypothesized that all voters were in constituencies where the three parties had equal chances of winning #28i.e.... In PAGE 13: ...here the three parties had equal chances of winning #28i.e., each party had a vote share of 33 1#2F3 #25 in the 1983 election in the constituency#29. We set variables M1 and M2 to zero, and used the estimated coe#0Ecients from Table1 to compute the utility of each party for each voter. We then assign the voter apos;s choice to the party they have the highest utility; this gives us each voter apos;s sincere vote.... ..."