### Table 2: PD equilibrium

2005

"... In PAGE 15: ...ection 4.3 discusses the policy implications of these results. 4.1 PD Regime: Partial decentralization without in- flation target Table2 summarizes the results in the PD regime. The detailed derivation is found in Appendix 2.... In PAGE 15: ...s found in Appendix 2.1. We discuss the economic intuition behind these results below. Inflation rate Comparing the inflation rate in Table 1 and Table2 , we can see that the inflation rate is higher in the PD regime than in the SB regime. This is the standard surprise inflation result.... In PAGE 18: ... A negative inflation target in the second period increases the amount of local bonds and thereby the second-period tax rate. This makes the negative second-period output gap (see Table2 ) deviate further from zero. This is the marginal cost of introducing a negative target.... ..."

### Table 1: Partial Policy Learning Algorithm

"... In PAGE 3: ... PRUDENT learns partial policies using the same strategy. Table1 shows the procedure. The algorithm is a modified value iteration procedure, which learns a partial value function to obtain a partial... ..."

### Table 3: Time-Consistent Equilibria with Alternative Policy Weights. Policy Weights Equilibrium Statistics

1999

"... In PAGE 63: ...and properties of the resulting time-consistent equilibrium, are described in the rst line of Table3 .) The large black dot instead indicates the weights that lead to the best outcome, when one still restricts attention to central bank loss functions with no smoothing objective ( = 0).... In PAGE 63: ... This corresponds to a weight ^ r that makes the time-consistent equilibrium implement the optimal non-inertial plan, characterized earlier. (Compare the second line of Table3 with the fth line of Table 2.) It involves a value ^ r lt; r; so that interest rates respond more vigorously to variations in the natural rate of interest than occurs under discretion when the central bank seeks to minimize the true social loss function.... In PAGE 63: ...1). As in the limiting case solved explicitly above, the optimal weights involve gt; 0; ^ r lt; 0: (The optimal weights and the properties of the resulting equilibrium are described on the fourth line of Table3 .) Finally, the star without a circle indicates the optimal equilibrium that can be achieved subject to the constraint that ^ r 0: (One might restrict attention to these cases, if one does not think it would be easy to explain to a central bank that it will be rewarded for creating interest-rate variability, while being punished for failing to smooth interest-rate changes.... In PAGE 63: ... In fact, consideration of values ^ x 6 = x allows us to do no better, either in the case of loss functions with no smoothing objective, or in the case of the fully unconstrained family. For the policy on the second line of Table3 already implements the optimal non-inertial plan, and the policy on the... In PAGE 64: ... For example, it would also be possible to impose the constraint that ^ x =0; so that there is no output-gap term in the central bank loss function at all. The optimal weights in this case are given on the fth line of Table3 . Note that again ^ r lt; 0; gt; 0: The only case in which it is of some bene t to relax the requirement that the relative weight on the inflation and output-gap terms in (4.... In PAGE 64: ... We now consider the optimal central bank of objective of the form (4.16), when we impose the constraint that ~ r 0: Figure 11 plots the value of E[W ] in the time-consistent equilibrium, as a function of the policy weights ~ and ~ ; in the case that ~ r =0: As in the earlier gures, the X marks the weights in the true social loss function (corresponding to the rst line in Table3 ). The star without a circle again indicates the best attainable policy in this plane, under the constraint... In PAGE 65: ... The star is at a point of tangency between an E[W ] isoquant and a vertical line at ~ =1= x; and corresponds to the policy described on the third line of Table 3. However, we observe that it is possible to reduce E[W ]bylowering~ , and the minimum value consistent with non-negative policy weights (indicated by the wheel in the gure, and described on the seventh line of Table3 ) involves ~ =0; so that a positive weight is assigned to output-gap stabilization, and none to inflation stabilization.71 Note that this constrained-optimal central bank loss function again involves ~ gt; 0; so that it is desirable for the central bank to seek to smooth interest-rate changes.... In PAGE 65: ... 5 Optimal Interest-Rate Feedback Rules We turn now to an alternative approach to implementation of the optimal pattern of re- sponses to shocks. Here we ask what kind of policy rule would achieve that end, assuming 71Further insight into why it is optimal to set ~ = 0 in this case may be provided by Figure 12, which plots E[W] as a function of ~ r and ~ , xing ~ at the value shown on the sixth line of Table3 , i.e.... In PAGE 72: ... Furthermore, we have already identi ed the optimal responses from among this family, as they are the ones associated with the time-consistent equilibrium when the policy weights in the central bank loss function (4.1) are chosen optimally (that is, the responses in the equilibria described in lines4{6of Table3 ).Thusweturntothequestionofwhetherafeedbackruleoftheform (5.... ..."

Cited by 8

### Table 1: Annual Average Overvaluation Due to Trade Policy Distortions Overvaluation (%)

"... In PAGE 6: ... In addition, protection to industry adversely affects the price of traded agricultural goods vis-a- vis other traded goods - an effect that operates in addition to the real exchange rate effect. The real exchange rate can be compared to the equilibrium real exchange rate in the absence of trade regime distortions2, and by this measure, the estimated influence of trade policy on the exchange rate in the past has been large ( Table1 ). However, this is a partial approach that only takes account of one of the many irLfluences on the real exchange rate (see Box 2).... In PAGE 27: ...current subsidy to current expenditure for the provincial governments, over the past 12 years, has varied from 19 percent to 44 percent. The same ratio for the federal government has varied from 36 percent to 97 percent ( Table1 0). Similarly, development subsidies bome almost exclusively by the federal government have also been high, from 24-83 percent of development expenditure.... In PAGE 30: ... To the extent that these problems are due to inladequate drainage (a public good), then the govrnment can play an increased role At the same time, the government has provided funds for the development and maintenance of prnvate tubewells, even though most of the benefits of tubewells are privately appropriated (althoug there may be some public benefit of tubewells arising from lowering of water tables). Particularly serious iS the neglect of operaions and maintenance expenditure on the irrigation system, which has consequently deteriorated ( Table1 2). The shortfal vanes by province, and is as high as 37 percent in Sind, and stems fran low water rates and inadequate assessent and coilection of charges B In addition, revenue does not go directly to the Provincial Irrigation Departmns, which creates poor collection incentivres.... ..."

### Table 4: Summary comparison of the base combinatorial bid- ding policy and quasi-equilibrium policy ( = 1:13, I = 1%) for Network SIMPLE.

2000

"... In PAGE 8: ... Thus, as shown in Figure 16, we see that the Zero and Zero/Suboptimal/Optimal regions are bigger than with the base protocol (Figure 10). The higher bids reduce the average efficiency, as shown in Table4 . Al- though increased overbidding causes producers to sometimes lose out on surplus they would have obtained with lower bids, producers gain more surplus on the bids they do win.... In PAGE 8: ... Al- though increased overbidding causes producers to sometimes lose out on surplus they would have obtained with lower bids, producers gain more surplus on the bids they do win. Table4 shows that on average, producers lose surplus by bidding the quasi-equilibrium policy, as compared to the base policy. Although we have not computed Bayes-Nash equilibria or quasi- equilibria for the other networks, we have performed limited devia- tion analysis with those networks.... ..."

Cited by 35

### Table 4: Summary comparison of the base combinatorial bid- ding policy and quasi-equilibrium policy ( =1:13, I =1%) for Network SIMPLE.

2000

"... In PAGE 8: ... Thus, as shown in Figure 16, we see that the Zero and Zero/Suboptimal/Optimal regions are bigger than with the base protocol (Figure 10). The higher bids reduce the average efficiency, as shown in Table4 . Al- though increased overbidding causes producers to sometimes lose out on surplus they would have obtained with lower bids, producers gain more surplus on the bids they do win.... In PAGE 8: ... Al- though increased overbidding causes producers to sometimes lose out on surplus they would have obtained with lower bids, producers gain more surplus on the bids they do win. Table4 shows that on average, producers lose surplus by bidding the quasi-equilibrium policy, as compared to the base policy. Although we have not computed Bayes-Nash equilibria or quasi- equilibria for the other networks, we have performed limited devia- tion analysis with those networks.... ..."

Cited by 35

### Table 5: Comparing Steady States, in Partial or General Equilibrium, with or without Medicare and Medicaid Expenditure Increase.

1999

"... In PAGE 25: ... Both in experiments 9 and 10 the government gradually increases the tax on labor income to finance its expenditures. Table5 compares outcomes across steady states (the initial steady state is common to all experiments). The first column reports the results for experiment 1, the second and third columns describe the final steady state for experiments 9 and 10.... ..."

Cited by 1

### Table 2: Separating Equilibrium with Import Subsidy

"... In PAGE 25: ... Thus, if tax collection to finance the subsidies is high, the investment subsidy might be the preferred policy. Table2 shows how the level of the import subsidy required to separate varies with the factor endowments for 5 cases. Case (a) corresponds to the values from Table 1 (KM = 15 and KX = 25), with each of the succeeding cases obtained by simultaneously reducing KM by 2.... In PAGE 27: ...Table2 indicates that as the degree of reliance on trade increases, the F government can separate itself at a lower import tariff. The reason for this can be seen by observing that the optimal tariff for the protectionist government rises as the volume of trade increases.... ..."